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ABSTRACT 
 
The main objective of this paper is to critically analyse the solutions that countries 
are currently implementing in response to the much-debated issue that the 
conventional investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) regime limits a host-state‘s 
space to make regulations under public policy. Consequently, the paper makes 
recommendations on viable solutions that countries can implement as solutions to 
the ISDS problems.  
 
In order to conduct the study, this paper uses the solutions to ISDS problems that 
have been implemented by the Republic of South Africa (RSA) and Australia 
respectively. The paper also compares the solutions implemented by RSA and 
Australia with some internationally recognised solutions.  
 
Chapters two and three of the paper discuss the backgrounds and also analyse the 
solutions to ISDS that have been implemented by RSA and Australia respectively.  
Chapter four contains the main findings and arguments of the paper. It analyses the 
strengths and weaknesses of the ISDS solutions that have been implemented by 
RSA and Australia respectively. One of the main findings of the paper is that 
retaining the conventional ISDS regime is less beneficial to developing and least 
developed countries and more beneficial to developed countries, largely due to the 
differing levels of outward investments that are present in these categories of 
countries.  
 
The paper recommends, inter alia, that, unlike developed countries, developing 
countries and least-developed countries should abrogate the conventional ISDS 
regime and only retain it in particular circumstances as explained in chapter five. The 
paper recommends that ISDS should only be utilised where state-state arbitration 
would unnecessarily politicise an investment dispute. The paper also finds the use of 
domestic court as undesirable to investment disputes. The paper recommends 
mediation as a more balanced avenue for resolving investment disputes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
KEY WORDS 
 
Abrogating investor-state dispute settlement 
Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Host-state‘s public policy 
Investment disputes 
Investor-state dispute settlement 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
Protection of Investments Act 2015 
Solutions to investor-state dispute settlement  
State-state arbitration 
Treaty-by-treaty approach 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ix 
 
LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
ADR    Alternative Dispute Resolution 
ANC   African National Congress 
BEE   Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment 
BIT   Bilateral Investment Treaty 
CETA Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the 
European Union and Canada 
DTI   Department of Trade and Industry 
EPA    Economic Partnership Agreement 
EU    European Union 
€   Euro 
FDI   Foreign Direct Investment 
FTA   Free Trade Agreement 
HDSAs  historically disadvantaged South Africans 
ICSID   International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
IIA   International Investment Agreement 
IPFSD  Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development  
IRR   South Africa Institute of Race Relations 
ISDS   Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
MPRD Act  Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 
NAFTA  North American Free Trade Agreement 
PCA    Permanent Court of Arbitration 
PI Act   Protection of Investment Act 
PMA   Philip Morris Asia Limited 
PML    Philip Morris Limited 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
PPI Bill  Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill 
RSA   Republic of South Africa 
SACCI   South African Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
SADC   Southern African Development Community 
SADC FIP  Southern African Development Community Protocol on Finance 
and Investment 
TPPA   Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 
TPP   tobacco plain packaging 
UNCTAD   United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UNICTRAL  United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
USA    United States of America 
US$   United States Dollar 
WTO   World Trade Organisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) is a form of resolution of disputes between 
foreign investors and the state that hosts the investment (host-state).1 ISDS allows 
foreign investors to initiate dispute settlement proceedings against a host-state, 
normally by means of arbitration proceedings.2 ISDS mechanisms are commonly 
provided for in trade / investment agreements between two states (bilateral) or more 
than two states (multilateral).3 They can also be found in domestic legislation or 
contracts.4 Both the foreign investor and the host-state must consent to ISDS before 
the proceedings may commence. Usually, the consent of the host-state is contained 
in the trade / investment agreement.5 The foreign investor consents to ISDS by 
submitting its claim to be resolved by ISDS proceedings.6   
 
Historically, foreign investment disputes were disputes between the host-state and 
the foreign investor‘s home-state (home-state), and were mostly resolved by means 
of diplomatic protection.7 Diplomatic protection is a ‗procedure employed by the state 
of nationality of the injured persons to secure protection of that person and obtain 
reparation for the internationally wrongful act inflicted.‘8 The evolution from 
diplomatic protection to ISDS was largely triggered by the establishment of 
                                                          
1
 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) ‗Background Information on the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)‘ 1 available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/ICSID%20Fact%20Sheet%20-
%20ENGLISH.pdf#search=BACKGROUND%20INFORMATION%20ON%20THE%20INTERNATION
AL%20CENTRE%20FOR%20SETTLEMENT%20OF%20INVESTMENT%20DISPUTES%20%28ICSI
D%29  (accessed 29 December 2016) (hereafter ICSID ‗Background Information on ICSID‘).  
2
 Gauthier A ‗Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: What is their History and where are they 
going?‘ (2015) Publication No. 2015-115-E 1 available at 
http://www.lop.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/2015-115-e.pdf (accessed 29 December 
2016) (hereafter Gauthier A (2015)).   
3
 Gauthier A (2015) 1.  
4
 ICSID ‗Background Information on ICSID‘ 1. 
5
 ICSID ‗Background Information on ICSID‘ 1.  
6
 Singh S & Sharma S ‗Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanism: The Quest for a Workable 
Roadmap‘ (2013) 29 Merkourios - International and European Law: General Issue 91 (hereafter Singh 
S & Sharma S (2013)).  
7
 Singh S & Sharma S (2013) 90. 
8
 Bernasconi-Osterwalder N ‗State-State Dispute Settlement in Investment Treaties‘ (2014) Best 
Practices Series 8 available at https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/best-practices-state-
state-dispute-settlement-investment-treaties.pdf (accessed 10 June 2016) (hereafter Bernasconi-
Osterwalder N (2014)).  
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international forums that resolve direct claims by persons (unlike states), and also 
the proliferation of treaties, which embody ISDS mechanisms.9  
 
Recourse to ISDS as a means for resolving disputes between foreign investors and 
host-states (investment disputes) was intensified with the coming into force of the 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals 
of Other States in 1966 (ICSID Convention).10 The creation of the ICSID Convention 
was advocated for by developed countries while developing countries had some 
reservations against it.11 The ICSID Convention established the International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), which is an institution that provides 
for facilities and services for arbitration and conciliation of investment disputes.12 
ICSID has two sets of procedural rules that may govern the initiation and conduct of 
its proceedings. These are the ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules; and the 
ICSID Additional Facility Rules.13 The ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules are 
available only when a dispute is between an ICSID Convention Contracting State 
(Contracting State) and a national of another Contracting State.14 The ICSID 
Additional Facility Rules are available for settlement of investment disputes where 
only the home-state or the host-state is a Contracting State.15 ICSID also administers 
investment disputes under other rules such as the Arbitration Rules of the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) rules.16 
 
Currently, the legitimacy of ISDS is becoming increasingly questioned.17 Various 
criticisms have been raised against ISDS. These include inconsistent and 
unintended interpretations of treaty clauses, costly and lengthy procedures, lack of 
                                                          
9
 Singh S & Sharma S (2013) 90.  
10
 Schreuer C ‗Course on Dispute Settlement: International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes‘ 2003 9 Available at http://unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232overview_en.pdf  accessed 30 
December 2016 (hereafter Schreuer C (2003)).  
11
 Singh S & Sharma S (2013) 91. 
12
 Article 1 of the ICSID Convention. 
13
 ICSID ‗Background Information on ICSID‘ 3. 
14
 Article 25 (1) of the ICSID Convention.   
15
 ICSID ‗ICSID Additional Facility Rules‘ 2006 5 available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/icsiddocs/Documents/AFR_English-final.pdf(accessed 20 
September 2016).   
16
 ICSID ‗Background Information on ICSID‘ 3. 
17
 Sornarajah M ‗Starting Anew in International Investment Law‘ (2012) 74 Columbia FDI Perspectives 
1 available at http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/01/FDI_74.pdf (accessed 12 July 2016) (hereafter 
Sornarajah M (2012)). 
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transparency,18 the efforts of law firms to develop strategies of litigation that states 
hardly contemplated when negotiating investment treaties,19 some arbitrators 
alternating between being an arbitrator and counsel in arbitration proceedings 
resulting in potential conflict of interest, institutional bias as only investors can bring 
claims, and allowing three non-democratically-elected individuals to decide matters 
that implicate a sovereign‘s right to pursue legitimate public policy objectives.20 This 
list is not exhaustive. Another major criticism of ISDS, which is the subject of this 
paper, is that it restricts the capacity of states to implement regulatory actions 
necessary to achieve legitimate policy objectives, such as the protection of public 
health, safety, environment, cultural diversity or public morals.21 This happens as 
ISDS empowers foreign investors to sue host-states for new regulatory measures 
that affect their investments, thereby causing what has been referred as a ‗regulatory 
chill‘.22 According to this criticism, the ability of the host-state to implement law and 
regulatory reforms designed to enhance public welfare is thereby constrained.23  
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, some prominent international arbitrators, 
practitioners, and scholars oppose the ISDS criticisms.24 They argue, inter alia, that 
the claims that ISDS interferes with states‘ policy space are ‗propagandistic 
screed.‘25 They have referred to doubters of ISDS as ‗leftist academics [and] anti-
globalisation groups.‘26 They argue that ISDS benefits all states, including 
developing states, and is even-handed,27 and that excluding ISDS from investment 
                                                          
18
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development ‗Investment Policy Framework for 
Sustainable Development‘ (2015) 84 available at 
http://unctad.org/fr/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2012d5_en.pdf (accessed 7 December 2016) 
(hereafter UNCTAD IPFSD (2015)) 
19
 Sornarajah M (2012) 2.  
20
 Jacobs BL ‗A Perplexing Paradox: "De-Statification" of "Investor-State" Dispute Settlement?‘ (2015) 
30 Emory International Law Review 25 (hereafter Jacobs BL (2015)). 
21
 Jacobs BL (2015) 22.  
22
 Perera T & Demeter D ‗A Balancing Act: Retaining Investor-State Dispute Settlement Provisions in 
Investment Agreements and Balancing Stakeholder Interests‘ (2012) 31 Australian Year Book of 
International Law 86 (hereafter Perera T & Demeter D (2012)). 
23
 Perera T & Demeter D (2012) 86. 
24
 Jacobs BL (2015) 21.  
25
 Bowler CN & Blanchard S ‗What's in a Meme? : The Truth about Investor-State Arbitration: why it 
need not, and must not, be repossessed by States‘ (2014) 52 Columbia journal of transnational law 
691 (hereafter Bowler CN & Blanchard S ‗The Truth about ISDS‘ (2014)). 
26
 Bowler CN & Blanchard S ‗The Truth about ISDS‘ (2014) 691.  
27
 Bowler CN & Blanchard S ‗From ―Dealing in Virtue‖ to ―Profiting from Injustice‖: The Case Against 
―Re-Statification‖ of Investment Dispute Settlement‘ (2014) Vol. 55 Harvard International Law Journal 
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treaties would negatively affect foreign direct investment (FDI) flow for a state.28 An 
analysis of whether inclusion of ISDS provisions in treaties increases FDI is 
contained in chapter four of this paper. 
 
The above notwithstanding, the current debate regarding problems with ISDS has 
moved on from whether or not there are problems with the conventional ISDS regime 
to how and to what extent to reform the ISDS regime.29 Thus, the problems with 
ISDS have been widely acknowledged by states. States are currently exploring 
innovative ways of changing their approaches to ISDS. By the end of 2014, at least 
50 states and regions were engaged in reviewing and revising their International 
Investment Agreement (IIA) models,30 which include ISDS provisions. Several states 
have decided that the conventional ISDS regime is not consistent with their 
developmental priorities.31 These states have negotiated for trade agreements 
without ISDS mechanisms, or and have considered withdrawing, while some have 
actually withdrawn from the ICSID Convention or from IIAs; for instance Bolivia, 
Ecuador, Venezuela and Nicaragua.32 India and Indonesia also indicated, in 2013 
and 2014 respectively, that they would review their IIA regimes.33   
 
The Republic of South Africa (RSA) is one of the states that have taken bold steps in 
reforming their ISDS regime. RSA started terminating its investment treaties in 2012 
following a three-year review of its investment policies.34 One consideration for this 
undertaking was RSA‘s involvement in a high profile ICSID arbitration case, Foresti 
vs. Republic of South Africa.35 This case made it clear to RSA authorities that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Online 45 (hereafter Bowler CN & Blanchard S ‗From ―Dealing in Virtue‖ to ―Profiting from Injustice‘ 
(2014)). 
28
 Perera T & Demeter D (2012) 108. 
29
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development ‗The Word Investment Report 2015‘ xi 
available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf (accessed 6 July 2016) (hereafter 
UNCTAD ‗The World Investment Report 2015‘).  
30
 UNCTAD ‗The World Investment Report 2015‘ xi. 
31
 Jacobs BL (2015) 26.  
32
 Jacobs BL (2015) 26.  
33
 Kurtz J & Nottage L ‗Investment Treaty Arbitration ―Down Under‖: Policy and Politics in Australia‘ 
(2015) Vol. 30 Issue 2 ICSID Review: Foreign Investment Law Journal 466 (hereafter Kurtz J & 
Nottage L (2015)). 
34
 Mossallam M ‗Process Matters: South Africa‘s Experience Exiting its BITs‘ University of Oxford 
Global Economic Governance Programme, Working Paper No. 97, 2015 4 available at 
http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/geg-wp-201597-process-matters-south-africas-
experience-exiting-its-bits (accessed 11 July 2016) (hereafter Mossallam M (2015)).    
35
 Jacobs BL (2015) 27.  
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ability of RSA to regulate its domestic public policy objectives was under serious 
threat from the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) obligations in general and ISDS in 
particular.36  Following the settlement of the case, RSA initiated a review of its 
investment policy regime.37 This case is explored in detail later in this paper.  
 
RSA has enacted the Protection of Investment Act (the PI Act).38 The PI Act provides 
a regulatory framework for foreign investment in RSA.39 Notably, the PI Act has 
excluded recourse to ISDS, limiting investors who have a dispute with RSA to resort 
to mediation, RSA domestic courts, independent tribunal or statutory bodies within 
RSA.40 Further, RSA government may consent to state-state arbitration with the 
home state of the investor subject to exhaustion of domestic remedies.41 The PI Act 
was assented into law on 15th December 2015,42 but is not yet in force.   
 
Australia is another state that has been preoccupied with changing its ISDS regime 
following similar ISDS problems discussed above with respect to RSA. In 2011, the 
Australian government made a landmark announcement that it would no longer 
include ISDS in its future trade agreements.43 This followed recommendations of the 
Productivity Commission‘s 2010 Research Report on Bilateral and Regional Trade 
Agreements which recommended, inter alia, that the government should seek to 
avoid the inclusion of ISDS provisions in investment agreements on the basis that 
such provisions posed considerable policy and financial risks.44 The Australian 
government‘s decision that it would no longer include ISDS provisions in its treaties 
was also influenced by a case in which Australia defended a high-profile ISDS case, 
                                                          
36
 Mossallam M (2015) 10. 
37
 Mossallam M (2015) 10. 
38
 Act number 22 of 2015; Joubert N ‗New Protection of Investment Act – The Implications for Foreign 
Investors‘ (2016) Caveat Legal available at http://www.caveatlegal.com/new-protection-of-investment-
act-the-implications-for-foreign-investors/ (accessed 18 July 2016) (hereafter Joubert N (2016)). 
39
 Mossallam M (2015) 4. 
40
 Section 13 (4) of the PI Act; see also Lang J ‗Bilateral Investment Treaties – Shield or Sword?‘ 13
th
 
December 2013 available at http://www.internationallawoffice.com/Newsletters/International-
Trade/South-Africa/Bowman-Gilfillan/Bilateral-investment-treaties-shield-or-sword (accessed 11 July 
2016).  
41
 Section 13 (5) of the PI Act.  
42
 Joubert N (2016)   
43
 Kurtz J & Nottage L (2015) 469. 
44
 Kurtz J & Nottage L (2015) 469. 
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the case of Philip Morris Asia Limited (Hong Kong) (PMA) vs The Commonwealth of 
Australia.45 This case is explored in more details later in this paper. 
 
However, since the coming in of a new Australian Government in 2013, Australia 
quietly reverted to a policy of including ISDS provisions in its treaties on a case-by-
case assessment (treaty-by-treaty approach).46 This means that Australia does not 
uniformly include ISDS provisions in all in treaties, but rather includes or excludes 
them depending on the circumstances of each treaty. The criteria used in the treaty-
by-treaty approach is discussed later in this paper.  
 
This research paper (paper) has been inspired by the two different solutions to ISDS 
that have been adopted by RSA and Australia respectively, in light of the problem 
that ISDS limits host-state‘s policy space to regulate on matters of public concern. 
Whilst RSA has decided to abrogate ISDS, Australia has decided to include ISDS on 
a case-by-case assessment.  
 
1.2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this research is to evaluate the two solutions to ISDS problems as 
implemented by RSA and Australia respectively, and use the evaluation to determine 
a viable solution to the problem that ISDS limits the host-state‘s policy space.  
 
The research objective can be broken down into the following aims: 
1.2.1. To critically analyse the solution of RSA to abrogate ISDS, and also analyse 
how RSA intends to handle investment disputes under its new ISDS regime. 
1.2.2. To critically analyse the solution of Australia to include ISDS provisions on a 
treaty-by-treaty approach and how Australia implements this approach. 
1.2.3. To identify and critically analyse the strengths and weaknesses of each of the 
two solutions to ISDS problems as adopted by RSA and Australia respectively, and 
also analyse the internationally recognised solutions to ISDS problems.   
1.2.4. To propose recommendations on more viable solutions to addressing the 
problem that ISDS limits a host state‘s policy space. 
                                                          
45
 Perera T & Demeter D (2012) 80. 
46
 Kurtz J & Nottage L (2015) 468; see also Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade ‗Investor-State Dispute Settlement‘ available at http://dfat.gov.au/trade/topics/Pages/isds.aspx 
(accessed 8 July 2016) (hereafter Australian Government ‗ISDS‘).   
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1.3. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM 
Effective dispute settlement mechanisms are important for any trade agreement, IIA 
or commercial arrangement, as they ensure that the rules embodied in the 
agreement or arrangement are effectively enforced.47 It is further argued that 
effective enforcement of commerce or economic rules is a critical component of the 
economic success of any state or region.48 ISDS is a form of dispute settlement 
mechanism, specifically designed for investment disputes. As several states are 
currently exploring various ways of reforming their approaches to ISDS, it is crucial 
that they should carefully handle this transition period in order to implement viable 
solutions to the problems. This paper contributes to this discourse by focusing on the 
solutions that states are currently implementing in response to ISDS problems. Two 
states that have taken bold steps in this regard are RSA and Australia respectively. 
By conducting a critical analysis of the solutions adopted by these two states, and 
also comparing them with some internationally recognised solutions, this paper 
reveals some of the strengths and weaknesses of the solutions that states are 
currently implementing. It is hoped that other states facing similar ISDS problems 
would draw useful from this paper. 
 
1.4. METHODOLOGY 
This research is a desktop study. The research is largely based on library research 
and internet sources. Primary sources will include various pieces of legislation from 
RSA and Australia, IIAs, BITs and various trade agreements. Secondary sources will 
include journal articles, internet sources, position papers and other scholarly 
material.  
 
As the paper focuses on the solutions implemented by RSA and Australia, it uses 
RSA and Australia as comparators. The research uses these two states as 
comparators for the following reasons. First, the two states have taken explicit 
positions on their solutions to ISDS problems. RSA has done this by enacting the PI 
Act which abrogates ISDS, while Australia has explicitly stated its position to include 
ISDS provisions on a treaty-by-treaty approach. Secondly, there is abundant 
literature available on the two states in relation to ISDS, which would contribute to 
                                                          
47
 McClure R ‗"Can the Leopard Change its Spots?"-A Call for an African Dispute Resolution 
Mechanism‘ (2014) 29 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 341 (hereafter McClure (2014)). 
48
 McClure (2014) 364. 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
the depth of this research. Thirdly, RSA is a developing country while Australia is a 
developed country. This paper uses the different levels of economic development of 
the two states to analyse whether the level of economic development of a state has 
any bearing on its ISDS policy. Finally, the paper uses RSA as the main comparator 
as it is hoped that other developing countries would draw useful lessons from the 
experience of RSA. 
 
1.5. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This paper consists of five chapters. 
 
Chapter one 
Chapter one is the introduction of the paper. It consists of the background, research 
objectives, research aims, significance of the problem, the methodology adopted by 
the paper and an outline of chapters.  
 
Chapter two 
Chapter two discusses the solution that has been implemented by RSA to exclude 
ISDS. It also critically analyses how investment disputes would be handled under 
RSA‘s new investment regulatory framework. 
 
Chapter three 
Chapter three discusses the solution that has been implemented by Australia to 
include ISDS provisions on a treaty-by-treaty approach. This chapter also critically 
analyses why Australia abandoned its former policy that excluded ISDS, and how 
Australia conducts the treaty-by-treaty approach.  
 
Chapter four   
Chapter four critically analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the two solutions 
implemented by RSA and Australia respectively. It also discusses the internationally 
recognised solutions to ISDS problems.  
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Chapter five 
This Chapter concludes the paper by summarising the findings of the paper and also 
by making recommendations on more viable solutions to ISDS that can be 
implemented by states. The recommendations are largely drawn from the 
experiences faced by RSA and Australia respectively. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
ABROGATION OF INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BY THE 
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter two analyses the reasoning behind RSA‘s decision to remove ISDS from its 
investment regulatory framework. The chapter starts by giving a brief background of 
how RSA entered into bilateral investment treaties (BITs). It then briefly discusses 
some of the issues that induced RSA to re-think its investment regulatory framework. 
These include the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Policy (BEE Policy) 
and the landmark case of Pieri Foresti and Ten others v The Republic of South 
Africa (Foresti case).49 These issues triggered a review of RSA‘s bilateral investment 
treaty policy framework (the review). One of the findings of the review was that the 
current system of ISDS opens the door for investors, in pursuance of their narrow 
commercial interests, to subject matters of vital national interest to unpredictable 
international arbitration through direct challenges to legitimate, constitutional and 
democratic policy-making.50 This chapter further analyses how the review culminated 
into the decision to terminate RSA‘s BITs with other states, and also saw the 
introduction of the PI Act as the new regulatory framework for investment law in 
RSA.  The chapter ends by analysing the bold move implemented by RSA of doing 
away with ISDS in its entirety.  
 
2.2. BRIEF BACKGROUND OF ISSUES THAT INDUCED THE REPUBLIC OF    
SOUTH AFRICA TO RE-THINK ITS INVESTMENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
2.2.1. Republic of South Africa’s Bilateral Investment Treaties Post-1994 
As RSA transitioned from Apartheid to democracy, it entered into BIT negotiations 
with several countries. RSA eventually signed 14 BITs between 1994 and 1997.51 
More BITs were signed, totalling 49 BITs by 1999 (some have not come into force till 
                                                          
49
 ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/07/1 available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=D
C1651_En&caseId=C90 (accessed 21 September 2016).  
50
 Carim X ‗Lessons from South Africa‘s BIT Review‘ (2013) Columbia FDI Perspectives 1 available at 
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/10/No_109_-_Carim_-_FINAL.pdf (accessed 21 September 2016) 
(hereafter Carim X Lessons from RSA‘s BIT Review (2013)).  
51
 Schlemmer EC ‗An Overview of South Africa‘s Bilateral Investment Treaties and Investment Policy‘ 
(2016) 1 ICSID Review 169. (hereafter Schlemmer EC (2016)).  
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date).52 These BITs are often referred to as first generation BITs.53 Although these 
BITs were entered into in order to enhance trade relations with other states, the main 
reason behind brokering so many BITs within a short period of time was because the 
new RSA Government wanted to send a message to the international community 
that RSA was an investment friendly destination and that any foreign investment in 
RSA would be afforded full protection.54 RSA had received minimal foreign direct 
investment (FDI) inflows during Apartheid due to a combination of international 
sanctions55 and anti-investment campaign aimed at forcing the then RSA 
Government to abandon the state-enforced racial repression.56   
 
Prior to 1994, RSA had no history and experience of negotiating BITs. As such, the 
first generation BITS were heavily in favour of foreign investors, without preserving 
some flexibility in RSA‘s critical public policy areas.57 RSA entered into these BITs 
blindly and hurriedly without first understanding the real nature and consequences of 
entering into such binding agreements. RSA was simply convinced that the BITs 
would create an ‗investment friendly‘ environment.58 For instance, the constitutional 
values and goals for social uplifting contained in RSA Constitution and also the aims 
sought to be addressed by the BEE policy were not featured in the BITs.59 
 
                                                          
52
 Schlemmer EC 2016; for BITs that are not yet in force see UNCTAD ‗International Investment 
Agreements Navigator: South Africa‘ available at 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/195#iiaInnerMenu (accessed 21 September 
2016) (hereafter UNCTAD International Investments Agreements Navigator: South Africa). 
53
 Davies R ‗Speech delivered by the Minister of Trade and Industry Dr Rob Davies at the South 
African launch of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Investment 
Policy Framework for Sustainable Development at the University of the Witwatersrand‘ 26 July 2012 2 
available at http://unctad.org/meetings/en/Miscellaneous%20Documents/South-Africa-Investment-
statement_Rob_Davies.pdf (accessed 21 September 2016) (hereafter Speech by Davies R (2012)).  
54
 Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) ‗Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy Framework Review: 
Government Position Paper‘ 2009 5 available at http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/docs/090626trade-bi-lateralpolicy.pdf (accessed 21 September 2016) (hereafter 
BIT Policy Framework Review (2009)).  
55
 Poulsen LNS ‗Sacrificing Sovereignty by Chance: Investment Treaties, Developing Countries and 
Bounded Rationality’ (unpublished Ph.D thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, 
2011) 260. 
56
 Burton J ‗Sanctions will Exacerbate Apartheid‘ (1986) 7 Economic Affairs 22. 
57
 BIT Policy Framework Review (2009) 5. 
58
 BIT Policy Framework Review (2009) 14. 
59
 Schlemmer EC (2016) 173. 
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RSA‘s BITs contain clauses that provide for the resolution of investment disputes 
through ISDS.60 Although RSA is not a Contracting State,61 the first generation BITs 
included the availability of ICSID arbitration under the assumption that RSA would 
eventually become a Contracting State during the subsistence of the BITs.62 In the 
meantime, however, the disputes would be submitted to ICSID arbitration pursuant 
to the ICSID Additional Facility Rules.63  
 
2.2.2. Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment Policy 
RSA introduced the BEE policy in 2003 and enacted the Broad-based Black 
Economic Empowerment Act (BBE Act).64 A BEE (Amendment) Act came into force 
in 2014.65 Along with the BEE (Amendment) Act also came the amended Codes of 
Good Practice on BEE policy. Section 9 of the BEE Act empowers the Minister of 
Trade and Industry to issue codes of good practice on black economic 
empowerment that may include, among other issues, guidelines for stakeholders in 
the relevant sectors of the economy to draw up transformation charters for their 
sector. 
 
The BEE policy is an RSA Government program aimed at redressing the inequalities 
of Apartheid by giving black people (this includes African, Coloured and Indian South 
Africans) economic opportunities previously not available to them.66 It is also aimed 
at equitably transferring and conferring ownership, management and control of 
RSA's financial and economic resources to the majority of the citizens.67  
                                                          
60
 For example see Article 9(2) of the BIT between RSA and Denmark available at 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3521 (accessed 20 September 2016). 
(hereafter RSA-Denmark BIT); The RSA-Denmark BIT is one of the BITs which have been 
terminated. 
61
ICSID ‗List of Contracting States and other Signatories of the Convention: as of 12
 
April 2016‘ 
available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/icsiddocs/Documents/List%20of%20Contracting%20State
s%20and%20Other%20Signatories%20of%20the%20Convention%20-%20Latest.pdf (accessed 20 
September 2016).  
62
 Schlemmer EC (2016) 183.  
63
 See Article 9(2)(a) of the RSA-Denmark BIT. 
64
 Act No. 53 of 2003.  
65
 Act No. 46 of 2013.  
66
 Mashigo K ‗Self-assessment of South Africa‘s Investment Regime in Relation to the OECD Codes 
of Liberalisation and the Principle of National Treatment: OECD-South Africa investment policy 
dialogue‘ 2014 30 available https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/South-Africa-Investment-
Regime.pdf (accessed 21 September 2016) (hereafter Mashigo K (2014)) . 
67
 Mashigo K (2014) 30. 
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Along with the BEE Act came the controversial Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act (MPRD Act)68 and the Broad-Based Socio-Economic 
Empowerment Charter for the South African Mining Industry (the Mining Charter).69 
One of the express objectives of the MPRD Act is to substantially expand 
opportunities for the historically disadvantaged South Africans (HDSAs) to enter the 
mineral and petroleum industries and to benefit from the exploitation of RSA‘s 
mineral and petroleum resources.70 The Mining Charter gets its mandate from 
section 100(2)(a) of the MPRD Act which requires the Minister of Minerals and 
Energy to develop a broad-based socio-economic empowerment charter that will set 
the framework, targets, and time-table for effecting the entry of the HDSAs into the 
mining industry, and allow them to benefit from the exploitation of the mining and 
mineral resources. The BEE legislation and policies were challenged by investors 
through ISDS based on the first generation BITs in the landmark Foresti case.  
 
2.2.3. Pieri Foresti and Ten Others Versus Republic of South Africa 
The claimants in the Foresti case were made up of several Italians and a 
Luxembourg-based company. Together they controlled much of RSA‘s Granite 
industry.71 The claimants filed a request for arbitration proceedings against RSA 
under the ICSID Additional Facility Arbitration Rules on 1st November 2006,72 
alleging expropriation pursuant to Article 5 of the BIT between RSA and Italy, and 
also the BIT between RSA and the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union 
respectively.73 There were several grounds for the claim. Generally, they claimed 
that expropriation took place by coming into force of the MPRD Act, combined with 
the Mining Charter, which extinguished certain old order mineral rights held by the 
                                                          
68
 Act No. 22 of 2002.  
69
 Available at https://www.westerncape.gov.za/Text/2004/5/theminingcharter.pdf (accessed 21 
September 2016) (hereafter the Mining Charter).   
70
 Section 2(d) of the MPRD Act. 
71
 South Africa Institute of Race Relations (IRR) ‗Submission to the DTI regarding the Promotion and 
Protection of Investment Bill of 2013‘ 31 January 2014 available at http://irr.org.za/reports-and-
publications/submissions-on-proposed-legislation/submission-to-the-dti-regarding-the-promotion-and-
protection-of-investment-bill-of-2013-2013-31-january-2015 (accessed 21 September 2016) (hereafter 
IRR (2014)).   
72
 Foresti case 3. 
73
 Foresti case 14; the BIT between RSA and the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union has been 
terminated, whilst the BIT between RSA and Italy is still in force, see International Investments 
Agreements Navigator: South Africa.  
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claimants, and also by introducing compulsory equity divestiture requirements with 
respect to the claimants‘ shares in their companies.74 The Mining Charter, inter alia, 
required mining companies to achieve 26 per cent HDSA ownership of mining assets 
by 2014, and publish employment equity plans directed towards achieving a baseline 
40 per cent HDSA participation in management by 2009.  
 
RSA argued, inter alia, that assuming the claimants had a valid claim for 
expropriation, the alleged expropriation was undertaken for important public 
purposes, and that the claimants had conceded as much in their arguments. 
Specifically, RSA explained that the MPRD Act and the Mining Charter were 
promulgated for the purpose, among other things, of enhancing the marginalisation 
of HDSAs and other negative social effects caused by Apartheid in general and the 
Mineral Rights Act75 in particular, and protecting the environment and the 
communities living in the vicinity of mining operations.76 RSA also argued that there 
could be no indirect expropriation because the actions in question were rational and 
proportional means of pursuing legitimate public regulatory purposes.77 
 
It has been reported that the Claimants claimed a total of US$266 Million from 
RSA.78 The merits of the Foresti case were settled by the parties outside arbitration 
before the substantive hearing took place.79 Under this settlement, RSA granted the 
claimants‘ companies new order mineral rights without requiring them to sell 26 per 
cent of their shares to HDSAs. Instead, the companies would be deemed to have 
complied with the Mining Charter by making a 21 per cent beneficiation offset and 
providing a 5 per cent employee ownership program for employees of the 
companies.80  
 
Despite the settlement, RSA requested the arbitration tribunal to issue an award on 
legal costs and fees. RSA‘s submission of fees totalled €5 765 467.12, and the 
                                                          
74
 BIT Policy Framework Review (2009) 31; see also Foresti case 15. 
75
 Act No. 50 of 1991.  
76
 Foresti case 19. 
77
 Foresti case 20. 
78
 IRR (2014). 
79
 Mossallam M (2015) 10.  
80
 Foresti case 21. 
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claimants‘ submission of fees totalled €5 333 146.91.81 The Tribunal ordered the 
claimants to make a ‗contribution to the costs incurred by [RSA]‘ in the sum of   €400 
000.00.82 Considering that the case was settled before a full hearing took place, the 
amounts of legal costs and fees claimed by both parties show that ISDS arbitration is 
very expensive and costly for host-state, especially if it is a developing or least 
developed state. High costs involved in ISDS have been identified as one of the 
shortfalls of the current ISDS regime.83   
 
2.2.4. Swiss Investor Versus Republic of South Africa 
It has been reported that between 2001 and 2004 RSA was dragged to ISDS by a 
Swiss investor under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, but the case was completed 
without any publicity of the issues involved or its outcome.84 The name of the Swiss 
investor was also not reported.85 Limited information is available on this case as its 
award was not publicised. According to the available information, a Swiss investor 
invested in property in the Limpopo province, intending to establish and develop a 
game farm and conference facilities on the property. The Swiss investor alleged that 
RSA police turned a blind-eye to the series of incursions upon the Swiss investor‘s 
property, and that the investment was subjected to an expropriation either by virtue 
of the cumulative destruction inflicted upon the property or, in the alternative, due to 
a domestic land claims process under which several local residents were seeking all 
or parts of the property in question.86 The case was brought under the BIT between 
RSA and Switzerland of 1995.87  
 
The arbitration tribunal found that RSA breached its BIT obligation to provide full 
protection and security due to the failure of police to protect the property of the Swiss 
investor. The claim for expropriation, however, was dismissed for insufficient 
evidence on the grounds that the land reform process on which the claim was based 
was still on-going.88 Even though the amount of damages payable was reduced 
                                                          
81
 Foresti case 24. 
82
 Jacobs BL (2015) 29; see also Foresti case 31.  
83
 UNCTAD IPFSD (2015) 84.  
84
 Schlemmer EC 2016 186. 
85
 Scherer M ‗Inventory of Arbitration Proceedings Based on Swiss Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT)‘ 
(2015) 33 ASA Bulletin 78 (hereafter Scherer M 2015). 
86
 Schlemmer EC (2016) 186. 
87
 This BIT has been terminated; see International Investments Agreements Navigator: South Africa. 
88
 Scherer M (2015) 78.  
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because the Swiss investor was found not have taken enough precautionary 
measures to secure and protect his property, RSA was ordered to pay R6 600 
000.00 plus interest and also to pay two-thirds of the Swiss investor‘s legal costs.89 
Although the amounts of interest and two-thirds of the investor‘s legal costs 
respectively are not known, from experience with the costs claimed in Foresti case, 
this paper assumes that these amounts were high. The taxpayer is the one that 
ultimately shoulders the burden of such huge payments from RSA Government.90 As 
it is discussed in the next section, these two ISDS cases against RSA formed part of 
the main reasons why RSA decided to conduct a review of its BIT policy framework.  
 
2.3. REVIEW OF THE BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY POLICY 
FRAMEWORK 
RSA, through the Department of Industry and Trade (DTI), initiated a review of its 
BIT policy framework in 2005, but the review formally commenced in 2008.91 The 
review was initiated as it became apparent that RSA was facing serious challenges 
from foreign investors from developed nations seeking compensation from RSA for 
alleged failure to comply with its obligations under the first generation BITs.92 The 
review was partly in response to the arbitral proceedings in the Foresti case and the 
Swiss Investor case which necessitated a need to conduct a risk assessment of the 
BITs.93 The review was aimed at establishing more balanced rights and obligations 
between parties to BITs and the adherence to standards that would not undermine 
RSA‘s national development policies, particularly BEE policies. In the words of Trade 
and Industry Minister Dr Rob Davies, the review would develop a framework that 
would aim ‗to achieve an appropriate balance between the rights and obligations of 
investors and the need to provide adequate protection of foreign investors, while 
ensuring that constitutional obligations are upheld and that the Government retains 
the policy space to regulate in the public interest.‘94 
 
                                                          
89
 Schlemmer EC (2016) 187. 
90
 Schlemmer EC (2016) 187. 
91
 BIT Policy Framework Review (2009) 12. 
92
 BIT Policy Framework Review (2009) 12. 
93
 BIT Policy Framework Review (2009) 12. 
94
 Klaaren J & Adeleke F ‗SA on the Right Path with New Foreign Investment Law‘ Business Day Live 
25 September 2015 available at http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2015/09/25/sa-on-the-right-path-with-
new-foreign-investment-law (accessed 21 September 2016) (hereafter Klaaren J & Adeleke F 2015).  
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The review process culminated into an RSA Government position paper published in 
June 2009 entitled Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy Framework Review (BIT review 
policy paper). One of the key findings of the BIT review policy paper was that ‗all 
BITs limit the regulatory flexibility within which [BIT] contracting parties can pursue 
their economic development policies.‘95 It further noted that the focus of BITs is on 
investor rights and that mention of investor obligations is rare, thus rendering the 
investment agreements incomplete.96   
 
One of the contentious issues out of the review was the recourse to ISDS by foreign 
investors against RSA.97 The review found no compelling reason why an investor‘s 
claims against RSA cannot be undertaken by local RSA institutions (for instance 
RSA courts), as long as the institutions are independent of the public authority and 
they discharge their duties in accordance with basic principles of good governance.98 
The review further found that the current system opens the door for investors, in 
pursuance of their narrow commercial interests, to subject matters of vital national 
interest to unpredictable ISDS through direct challenges to legitimate, constitutional 
and democratic policy-making.99 The Foresti case was cited as an example in this 
regard.100 It was thus concluded that BITs allow foreign investors to sue states (in 
this case RSA) in ISDS forums, by-passing domestic courts, which adjudicate 
matters on narrow financial interests and not broader social and public 
imperatives.101 
 
In April 2010, RSA Cabinet largely endorsed the recommendations emanating from 
the review. Cabinet agreed that BITs pose risks and limitations on the ability of RSA 
Government to pursue its Constitutional-based transformation agenda.102 As such, 
                                                          
95
 BIT Policy Framework Review (2009) 47.  
96
 BIT Policy Framework Review (2009) 47. 
97
 Carim X Lessons from RSA‘s BIT Review (2013) 4. 
98
 Maupin J & Langford M ‗Submission Concerning the Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy Framework 
Review Government Position Paper‘ 12 August 2009 42 available at 
https://www.elaw.org/system/files/Comments%20on%20DTI%20BITs%20review%20FINAL.pdf 
(accessed 21 September 2016) (hereafter Maupin J & Langford M (2009)). 
99
 Carim X Lessons from RSA‘s BIT Review (2013) 1.  
100
 BIT Policy Framework Review 31. 
101
 Mlumbi-Peter X ‗South Africa‘s Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill: Presentation to the 
Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry‘ 16 September 2015 8 available at 
https://www.thedti.gov.za/parliament/2015/dti_Response_PPIB.pdf (accessed 21 September 2016) 
(hereafter Mlumbi-Peter X 16 September (2015)).   
102
 Speech by Davies R (2012) 2. 
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Cabinet concluded that RSA should refrain from entering into BITs in future, except 
in cases of compelling economic and political circumstances.103 It also decided to 
terminate existing BITs and offer partner countries the possibility to re-negotiate BITs 
on the basis of a new model to be developed.104 It further decided to develop a new 
Act on foreign investment that is aligned with the RSA Constitution and clarifies 
typical BIT provisions.105 This new era of investment regulatory framework in RSA is 
discussed in the next sections. 
 
2.4. TERMINATION OF BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 
The basis of Cabinet‘s decision to terminate existing BITs was not only that the BIT 
dispute resolution clauses allow foreign investors to take RSA to ISDS. There were 
also other aspects (clauses) of the first generation BITs which were assessed to be 
questionable and not in tandem with RSA‘s Constitution as read together with RSA‘s 
legitimate policies including BEE. Some of the most contentious aspects included 
obligations specifying the standard of treatment that the BIT contracting parties are 
required to provide to an investment once it has been established. These standards 
of treatment include national treatment, most-favoured-nation treatment, fair and 
equitable treatment, full protection and security, what constitutes expropriation and 
its attendant amount of compensation.106 The BIT review policy paper discusses 
these issues in more detail. However, these issues are not the concern of this paper.  
 
Following RSA Cabinet‘s decision to terminate first generation BITs, RSA terminated 
(in some instances sending notices of termination or notification of intention to 
terminate) BITs with the following countries: the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Germany, France, Cuba, Denmark, Austria, Italy, Sweden, Argentina, 
Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union, Finland, Spain and Greece.107 However, the 
following contracting parties to BITs apparently did not receive notices of termination 
or any intention to terminate the BITs: South Korea, China, Mauritius, Senegal, 
Russia, Nigeria and Zimbabwe.108 Thus, these BITs are still in force.109 This shows 
that RSA was selective on which BITs to terminate.   
                                                          
103
 Speech by Davies R (2012) 2.  
104
 Speech by Davies R (2012) 2. 
105
 Carim X Lessons from RSA‘s BIT Review (2013) 2.  
106
 BIT Policy Framework Review (2009) 8.  
107
 Schlemmer EC 2016 189. 
108
 This is the status of BITs in RSA as of 19 May 2015; see Schlemmer EC (2016) 189.  
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2.5. THE PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT ACT 
As stated above, aside from the decision to terminate BITs, Cabinet also decided to 
develop a new Act on foreign investment in RSA. The RSA Government released a 
draft Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill (PPI Bill) for public comments in 
November 2013. The PPI Bill was intended to contain the main regulatory framework 
for foreign investment in RSA.110 It was intended to provide investors with a domestic 
law that would protect their investments, especially in light of the BITs that RSA was 
terminating.111 The PPI Bill went through rigorous consultation processes with 
Government and other stakeholders, including an extensive public comment and 
consultations period.112 During this period, Government, through DTI, received 
numerous comments from various stakeholders and organisations.  
 
RSA Cabinet eventually endorsed a revised version of the PPI Bill on 24 June 2015 
and it was introduced in Parliament in July 2015.113 The PPI Bill was assented into 
law by RSA President on 15 December 2015,114 and is now called the Protection of 
Investment Act (the PI Act).115  The PI Act is yet to come into force. 
 
Section 4 of the PI Act provides that the purpose of the Act is, inter alia, to protect 
investment in accordance with and subject to RSA Constitution, in a manner which 
balances the public interest and the rights and obligations of investors, and to affirm 
RSA‘s sovereign right to regulate investments in the public interest. 
 
‗[The PI Act] tried to achieve a situation where the Government‘s decisions on 
beneficiation and black economic empowerment could not be challenged 
before foreign or international tribunals as encroaching on investments or 
expropriating investments of foreign investors, thus striking a balance 
between protecting the investor‘s rights and the government‘s regulatory 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
109
 UNCTAD International Investments Agreements Navigator: South Africa. 
110
 Mossallam M (2015) 4.  
111
 Mossallam M (2015) 13.  
112
 Mlumbi-Peter X ‗South Africa‘s Protection of Investment Bill Presentation to the Select Committee 
on Trade and International Relations‘ 24 November 2015 6 available at 
https://www.thedti.gov.za/parliament/2015/PIB24112015.pdf (accessed 21 September 2016) 
(hereafter Mlumbi-Peter X 24 November 2015).  
113
 Mlumbi-Peter X 24 November 2015 6.  
114
 See Government Gazette No. 39514 of 15 December 2015 available at 
https://www.thedti.gov.za/gazzettes/39514.pdf (accessed 21 September 2016). 
115
 Act No. 22 of 2015.  
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space to give effect to its constitutional obligations without having to answer to 
international tribunals and pay damages and/or compensation for actions 
taken that are seen to be totally legitimate within its internal policies to redress 
the inequalities of the past, ensure economic development for all its 
peoples.‘116 
 
The PI Act contains several issues that will bring new approaches to investment 
regulatory framework in RSA. One of the notable issues is the absence of ISDS as 
an avenue for resolving investment disputes.117 The PI Act also introduces other new 
issues which are not discussed in this paper. These include that an investor‘s right to 
property would be dealt with in terms of Section 25 of RSA Constitution,118 and the 
definition of an investor as any enterprise making an investment in RSA regardless 
of nationality.119 As already stated in chapter one, this paper is only concerned with 
the exclusion of ISDS and the alternatives to ISDS that have been provided for under 
the PI Act. This forms the discussion in the next section of this paper.  
 
2.6. RESOLUTION OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES UNDER THE PROTECTION OF 
INVESTMENT ACT  
In terms of the PI Act, ISDS shall no longer be an avenue for resolving investment 
disputes against RSA.120 Instead, the PI Act provides for several avenues that are 
available to any investor that has a dispute in respect of any action taken by RSA 
government. First, an investor may take the dispute to mediation facilitated by the 
DTI, which shall appoint a mediator.121 The mediator must be agreed upon by both 
the investor and RSA government (the parties).122 In the event that DTI is a party to 
the dispute, the parties may jointly request the Judge President of one of the 
divisions of the High Court to appoint a mediator.123 Section 13(2)(c) of the PI Act 
provides that mediation would be governed by prescribed rules. The DTI has 
recently published Draft Regulation on Mediation Rules (Draft Regulations) that will 
govern mediation of investment disputes, and has invited the public to submit their 
                                                          
116
 Schlemmer EC (2016) 190. 
117
 Section 13 of the PI Act.  
118
 Section 10 of the PI Act.  
119
 Section 1 of the PI Act. 
120
 Section 13 of the PI Act. 
121
 Section 13(1) of the PI Act.  
122
 Section 13(2)(b) of the PI Act.  
123
 Section 13(2)(c) of the PI Act. 
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comments.124 The Draft Regulations are, thus, not yet in force. The Draft Regulations 
are discussed in more detail in chapter four. 
 
Further, an investor may also seek redress from any competent court, independent 
tribunal or statutory body within RSA.125 This provision is vague. More certainty could 
have been achieved by stating the independent tribunals or statutory bodies within 
RSA that would be vested with such authority. Further, the PI Act does not state 
which court in RSA investors should approach. RSA has several courts in its 
hierarchy of courts.126 This paper argues that the PI Act should have included a 
definition of court in section 1. As it is, it leaves it open to the investor to ascertain 
the competent court in this regard. This paper argues that the competent court being 
referred to here is the High Court of South Africa as it has the authority to decide on 
any matter which has not been assigned to a particular court by an Act of 
Parliament.127 
 
The PI Act also provides for state-state international arbitration, upon exhaustion of 
the domestic remedies discussed above. This means that such arbitration would be 
conducted between RSA and the investor‘s home state.128 The strengths and 
weaknesses of state-state arbitration as an avenue for resolving international 
investment disputes are discussed in more detail in Chapter four.  
 
The removal of ISDS from RSA‘s investment regulatory framework is said to be of 
major concern to foreign investors.129  It has been argued that this will decrease FDI 
inflow in RSA.130 This seems to be supported by the negative sentiment that was 
expressed by the European Union, through De Gucht,131 who was reported to have 
said that the unilateral change of the investment regime was not good, and is not 
                                                          
124
 DTI ‗Draft Regulations on Mediation Rules‘ 30 December 2016 Government Gazette No. 40526 of 
2016 available at http://www.gov.za/documents/protection-investment-act-regulations-comments-
invited-30-dec-2016-0000  (accessed 11 January 2017). 
125
 Section 13(4) of the PI Act.  
126
 Section 166 of RSA Constitution of 1996 (RSA Constitution). 
127
 Section 169(1)(b) of the RSA Constitution.   
128
 Section 13(5) of the PI Act.  
129
 Webb M ‗No More BITs and Pieces‘ (2013) Without Prejudice December 12 (hereafter Webb M 
(2013)).  
130
 Webb M (2013) 10.  
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 European Commissioner for Trade from February 2010 until 31 October 2014. 
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good for RSA.132 This issue, together with other advantages and disadvantages of 
RSA‘s move to exclude ISDS, is fully explored in Chapter four. 
 
Another important aspect to consider in light of RSA‘s removal of ISDS is how 
investment disputes would be handled whilst awaiting the PI Act to come into force. 
Disputes between foreign investors and RSA that may arise as a result of an alleged 
BIT breach may still be taken to ISDS in terms of the terminated BITs until the sunset 
period runs out.133 Sunset period is the period of time specifically provided for in 
BITs, during which all investments made prior to the date of termination of the BIT 
would still be protected under the BIT provisions despite its termination. For 
instance, the BIT between RSA and Germany (RSA-Germany BIT) has a sunset 
period of 20 years134 while the BIT between RSA and Denmark has a sunset period 
of ten years.135  However, until the PI Act comes into operation, disputes that arise 
between RSA and new investors that do not fall under the protection of any of the 
BITs would be resolved by recourse to RSA courts or local arbitration if consensus 
on an arbitration agreement can be reached between the parties.136 
 
Whilst the PI Act focuses on investment regulatory framework, and is not expansive 
on other issues incidental to investment, other statutes and policies shall work with 
the PI Act to complement it on the incidental issues. These include the Expropriation 
Bill, the International Arbitration Bill, the Property Valuation Act137 and the 
Infrastructure Development Act.138 
 
2.10. CONCLUSION 
This Chapter has explored why and how RSA removed ISDS as an avenue available 
to investors to resolve investment disputes. The Chapter shows that the problem 
started when RSA blindly entered into BITs with other states in the wake of 
democracy, in order to send a message to the international community that RSA was 
an investment-friendly destination. The BITs contained dispute resolution clauses 
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which allow foreign investors to take RSA to ISDS alleging that RSA has breached 
provisions of the BITs. The conduct by RSA Government which the foreign investors 
complain of normally consists of actions taken by RSA in furtherance or promotion of 
legitimate policies of national interest, particularly the BEE policy.  
 
This Chapter has also explored how the challenges brought forth by the foreign 
investors against RSA through ISDS prompted RSA to conduct a review of its BIT 
policy framework. This process culminated into, inter alia, a decision to terminate 
some of the first generation BITs, and a decision to promulgate a new investment 
Act. The PI Act was enacted in this regard and is yet to come into force.  The PI Act 
has removed ISDS as an avenue for resolving investment disputes with RSA. The PI 
Act has replaced ISDS with domestic mechanisms including mediation, domestic 
courts, and independent tribunals, with possible state-state arbitration upon 
exhaustion of domestic remedies. This development has prompted mixed reactions 
among various stakeholders.  
 
As stated in chapter one, Australia has also been embroiled in the ISDS conundrum, 
and has implemented a solution that is different from the one implemented by RSA. 
The next chapter discusses Australia‘s ISDS conundrum and critically analyses the 
solution that it has implemented.   
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CHAPTER THREE: 
TREATY-BY-TREATY APPROACH TO INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT: THE CASE OF AUSTRALIA  
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter three explores why and how Australia adopted its current policy of including 
ISDS provisions on a treaty-by-treaty approach (also known as case-by-case 
assessment). The chapter begins by analysing the background issues that were 
highly debated throughout the period in which Australia made a landmark 
announcement of its policy to exclude ISDS provisions in its treaties, before reverting 
to the current policy of including ISDS provisions on a treaty-by-treaty approach. 
These background issues include the tobacco plain packaging laws (TPP laws), the 
case of Phillip Morris Asia Limited v the Commonwealth of Australia139 (Phillip Morris 
Case) and the Productivity Commission Research Report on Bilateral and Regional 
Trade Agreements (the Productivity Commission Report).  
 
This chapter also discusses the public policy debate that took place among 
Australia‘s policy makers, which culminated into the current policy of including ISDS 
provisions on a treaty-by-treaty approach. Further, this chapter analyses the factors 
that guide Australia‘s treaty-by-treaty approach.  
    
3.2. BACKGROUND ISSUES TO AUSTRALIA’s CURRENT INVESTOR-STATE 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT POLICY 
 
3.2.1. Australia’s Plain Packaging Laws 
At the heart of the ISDS debate in Australia were the TPP laws, which were 
introduced as part of a fight against the smoking problem in Australia. Smoking is 
one of the main causes of preventable deaths in Australia.140 According to Australia‘s 
Health Department, each year, smoking kills an estimated 15 000 Australians and 
costs Australia about US$31.5 Billion in social (including health) and economic 
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costs.141 As such, the Australian Government committed that by 2018, it should 
reduce the national adult daily smoking rate to 10 per cent and halve the Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander adult daily smoking rate.142 
 
Australia introduced the TPP laws as part of the Australian government policy to fight 
the smoking problem. The Tobacco Plain Packaging Act (TPP Act) became law in 
Australia on 1 December 2011.143 The TPP Act was introduced together with the 
Tobacco Plain Packaging Regulations 2011 (TPP Regulations)144 and the 
Competition and Consumer (Tobacco) Information Standard 2011 (Consumer 
Information Standard).145 According to the Australian Government, the TPP Act is 
part of a comprehensive range of tobacco control measures to reduce the rate of 
smoking in Australia and is an investment in the long-term health of Australians. 
Further, the Australian Government argues that the TPP laws are based on a broad 
range of peer-reviewed studies and reports, and supported by leading Australian and 
international public health experts.146 
 
According to section 3(2) of the TTP Act, it is the intention of the Australian 
Government to regulate the retail packaging and appearance of tobacco products in 
order to reduce the appeal of tobacco products to consumers, increase the 
effectiveness of health warnings on the retail packaging of Tobacco products, and 
reduce the ability of the retail packaging of tobacco products to mislead consumers 
about the harmful effects of smoking.  
 
The TPP laws prohibit the use of logos, brand imagery, and promotional text on 
tobacco products and packaging, and includes restrictions on colour, size, format 
                                                          
141
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and materials of packaging, as well as the appearance of the brand.147 The 
Consumer Information Standard specifies the new health warnings required to 
appear on all Tobacco retail packaging. For instance, it is a requirement that health 
warnings must cover at least 75 per cent of the front of most tobacco packaging and 
90 per cent of the back of the packaging.148 
 
TTP laws have been heavily challenged by tobacco companies that operate in 
Australia. One of the biggest oppositions so far came from a giant tobacco company 
called Phillip Morris Asia Limited through ISDS. This case is discussed in the next 
section. The TPP laws were also challenged in Australia‘s domestic courts in the 
cases of JT International SA v Commonwealth of Australia149 and British American 
Tobacco Australasia Limited and ORS v The Commonwealth of Australia.150 In both 
cases, the claimants were tobacco companies which were registered owners of 
trademarks, patents and designs in Australia. They claimed that their tobacco 
products use distinctive words, colours, designs, logos, lettering and markings which 
distinguish them from other tobacco products.151 The claimants alleged that the 
provisions of the TPP Act, as far they restricted their use of logos, colours, brand 
imagery, words and design on tobacco products and packaging, constituted an 
acquisition of their property otherwise than on just terms.152 In both cases, however, 
the High Court of Australia ruled that the TTP Act was valid as it did not acquire any 
property.153 The claimants‘ cases were thus dismissed and they did not appeal 
against these decisions. These two cases provide important insight on the ISDS 
debate as they demonstrate that public policy regulations can also be challenged in 
the domestic courts.  
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The TTP laws were also challenged through World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
dispute settlement process. However, the proceedings were suspended following an 
agreement by the parties to find a mutually agreed solution.154 
 
3.2.2. Phillip Morris Asia Limited v the Commonwealth of Australia 
The Phillip Morris case was heard under the auspices of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration (PCA), under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.155 The claimant, Phillip 
Morris Asia Limited, described itself as the regional headquarters for the Asia region 
of the Philip Morris International group of companies (PMI Group). The Claimant 
owned 100 per cent of the shares in Philip Morris (Australia) Limited (PM Australia), 
a holding company incorporated in Australia, which in turn owned 100 per cent of the 
shares in Philip Morris Limited (PML). PML is a trading company incorporated in 
Australia, which engages in the manufacture, import, marketing and distribution of 
tobacco products for sale within Australia. PML has rights with respect to certain 
intellectual property in Australia, including registered and unregistered trademarks, 
copyright works, registered and unregistered designs, and overall product 
packaging. The claimant contended that its entire business, and that of PML and PM 
Australia, rests on its intellectual property, and in particular on the recognition of its 
brands on the market.156   
 
The dispute was commenced pursuant to the Agreement between the Government 
of Hong Kong and the Government of Australia for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments (the Hong Kong - Australia BIT).157 The claimant alleged, inter alia, that 
the TPP laws bar the use of intellectual property on tobacco products and packaging, 
transforming the claimant‘s subsidiary in Australia from a manufacturer of branded 
products to a manufacturer of commoditised products with the consequential effect 
of substantially diminishing the value of the claimant‘s investments in Australia.158 
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The claimant also alleged that the TPP laws violated the Hong Kong – Australia BIT 
by, inter alia, treating the claimant‘s investment unfairly and inequitably, and failing to 
provide full protection and security for the investments.159 The claimant sought an 
order that Australia should, inter alia, take appropriate steps to suspend enforcement 
of TPP laws and to compensate the claimant for loss suffered through compliance 
with plain packaging legislation.160 The amount claimed in the dispute was described 
in the Notice of Arbitration as an ‗amount to be quantified but of the order of billions 
of Australian dollars.‘161  
 
The claim, however, was dismissed at a preliminary stage. Australia raised a 
preliminary objection that the arbitration tribunal was barred from considering the 
claim because the dispute had arisen before the claimant had obtained the 
protection of the Hong Kong - Australia BIT as a result of restructuring its investment 
in PML or because the claimant‘s restructuring constituted an abuse of right.162 The 
arbitration tribunal held that the claimant had failed to show that, prior to 
restructuring, it had control with a substantial interest over PM Australia and PML 
investments.163 The arbitration tribunal applied the principle that the initiation of 
treaty-based ISDS constitutes an abuse of procedural rights or an abuse of process 
when an investor has changed its corporate structure to gain the protection of an 
investment treaty at a point in time when a specific dispute was foreseeable. A 
dispute is foreseeable when there is a reasonable prospect that a measure which 
may give rise to a treaty claim will materialise.164  The arbitration tribunal concluded 
that at the time of the restructuring, the dispute had materialised and was 
foreseeable to the claimant.165 The arbitration tribunal further concluded that the 
main and determinative, if not sole, reason for the restructuring was the intention to 
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bring an ISDS claim under the Hong Kong – Australia BIT, using an entity from Hong 
Kong.166 The claim was therefore dismissed as it was held that the initiation of the 
claim constituted an abuse of rights.167  
 
The Phillip Morris Case was one of the driving forces behind the 2011 policy shift in 
Australia to exclude ISDS provisions from its future treaties. As indicated in the 
introduction above, the other driving force for this ISDS policy shift was the 
recommendation of Australia‘s Productivity Commission. The Productivity 
Commission Report is discussed in the next section.  
 
3.2.3. The Productivity Commission Research Report on Bilateral and Regional 
Trade Agreements 
The Productivity Commission Report highly influenced the Australian Government to 
introduce the policy that excluded ISDS provisions from Australia‘s treaties. The 
Productivity Commission is an independent government agency in Australia ‗whose 
past work injected admirable rigour and objectivity into the Australian policy-making 
process.‘168 The Australian Government requested the Productivity Commission in 
2010 to undertake a study and provide advice on the impact of bilateral and regional 
trade agreements on trade and investment and on Australia's trade and economic 
performance.169 One of the aspects of that research focused on the relevance of 
including ISDS provisions in Australia‘s treaties.     
 
Among other things, the Productivity Commission Report concluded that there does 
not appear to be an underlying economic problem that necessitated the inclusion of 
ISDS provisions in treaties, and that available evidence did not suggest that ISDS 
provisions have a significant impact on investment flows in Australia. It also made a 
finding similar to the finding made in RSA‘s BIT review policy paper (discussed in 
chapter two) that ISDS provisions can restrict a government‘s ability to undertake 
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welfare-enhancing reforms, popularly known as ‗regulatory chill‘.170 The Productivity 
Commission Report reiterated that this problem is not only present in developing 
countries seeking to improve their standards of regulation, but also in developed 
countries like Australia.171 It further highlighted the potential for large claims for 
compensation which would be paid out by host countries sued under ISDS.172 For 
these reasons, the Productivity Commission Report advised that Australia should 
seek to avoid accepting ISDS provisions in its treaties, which confer additional 
substantive or procedural rights on foreign investors over and above those already 
provided by the Australian legal system.173 This advice was followed by the 
Australian Government when it announced in 2011 that it would exclude ISDS 
provisions in its future treaties. 
 
The Productivity Commission Report has, however, been heavily criticised for its 
alleged shallow analysis of ISDS discipline. First, the criticism is that the Productivity 
Commission failed to appreciate the complexity of the issue regarding whether there 
are indeed any positive investment benefits that flow from entering into BITs. That 
instead of fully engaging with the complex literature on that issue, the Productivity 
Commission only considered one study in coming to the conclusion that committing 
to ISDS does not influence foreign investment flows into a country.174 The second 
criticism was that when discussing the factors that influence foreign investment 
inflows into a country, the Productivity Commission Report largely focused on the 
quantitative liberalisation of border restrictions such as screening processes and 
tariffs.175 However, unlike trade in goods, the critical barriers to foreign investment do 
not mainly take the form of simple border measures, rather, what is more important 
are ‗behind-the-border regulatory interventions‘, which, if discriminatory or arbitrary, 
can lessen or even extinguish the profitability of foreign investment in the receiving 
country.176 The third criticism was that the Productivity Commission Report ignored 
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the relevance of ISDS in relation to Australia‘s outbound investments and only 
focused on inbound investments, leaving the former at risk.177  
 
As is discussed in the next sections, these criticisms are relevant as they played a 
big role in order for Australia to later abandon the policy of excluding ISDS provisions 
and turn to the policy of including ISDS provisions on a treaty-by-treaty basis. These 
criticisms are part of the ISDS debate that took place among Australia‘s policy 
makers and continues to take place till date. The next section analyses the political 
context of the ISDS debate in Australia, which eventually culminated into the current 
policy of including ISDS on treaty-by-treaty approach. 
 
3.3. INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT POLICY DEBATE IN 
AUSTRALIA 
Australia‘s policy shifts regarding ISDS cannot be separated from its political context. 
The policy shifts have largely followed the change of political party that is in 
government. This can be traced back to 2004 when the Liberal Party (the political 
party that was in government at that time) was about to sign the Australia – United 
States of America Free Trade Agreement (Australia-USA FTA). The Australia-USA 
FTA was intended to include ISDS provisions until the Labour Party (the main 
opposition party at that time) indicated that they would block the implementing 
legislation for the Australia-USA FTA in Parliament.178 This sparked one of the 
biggest public debates over a trade agreement in Australia.179 The community, lobby 
groups and non-governmental organisations campaigned, inter alia, against the 
inclusion of ISDS provisions in the Australia-USA FTA. The reasons for the 
campaign were largely influenced by the observed experiences of the countries that 
were party to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), who had by then 
been exposed to several ISDS claims by USA investors.180 As such, the Australian 
public was concerned that ISDS provisions would negatively impact public policy in 
Australia as they believed it had under NAFTA.181 Consequently, the ISDS 
provisions were dropped from the Australia-USA FTA and the agreement was 
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ratified.182 Disputes under the Australia-USA FTA would be settled by consultations 
between the parties.183  
 
The Labour Party came into power in 2007. In 2010 it declared it continued to have 
reservations about ISDS provisions.184 This was followed by the landmark 
announcement that Australia would no longer include ISDS provisions in its future 
treaties.185 Accordingly, in 2012 Australia entered into an FTA with Malaysia that did 
not include ISDS provisions.186 Instead, the Australia-Malaysia FTA provides for 
conciliation, mediation, arbitral panels and FTA Joint Commissions as avenues for 
resolving disputes that arise out of the Australia-Malaysia FTA.187 
 
Since the Liberal Party-led coalition came back into power in 2013, it quietly shifted 
to a policy of including ISDS provisions on a treaty-by-treaty approach.188 This 
remains Australia‘s policy till date.189 Accordingly, ISDS provisions were included in 
the FTA with Korea and China, but not with Japan.190 Both the Australia-China FTA 
and the Australia–Korea FTA require the parties to attempt to resolve the dispute by 
consultations and negotiation before resorting to ISDS.191 The Australia–Japan FTA 
allows foreign investors access to domestic courts of the host-state.192 Further, the 
Australia-Japan FTA provides for consultation, conciliation, mediation and arbitral 
proceedings set up under the FTA itself as other available methods for resolving 
disputes under it.193 The Liberal-led coalition party won Australia‘s recent Federal 
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Elections of 2016,194 hence the policy of including ISDS provisions on treaty-by-
treaty approach continues till date.  
 
3.4. TREATY-BY-TREATY APPROACH TO INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT  
This section analyses how Australia implements the treaty-by-treaty approach in 
order to ascertain which treaty to include ISDS provisions and which one not to. The 
Australian Government‘s policy to include ISDS provisions on a treaty-by-treaty 
approach is published on its official webpage.195 However, the Australian 
Government has not clarified how the treaty-by-treaty assessment is done. 
Elaboration on how the treaty-by-treaty assessment would be conducted is found in 
writings of eminent experts on ISDS in Australia such as Professor Luke Nottage.196 
The factors (criteria) that are taken into account in the treaty-by-treaty assessment 
appear to be whether: 
 
‗[1] there are perceived problems with protections available to investors under 
national laws enforced by local courts or tribunals, especially in less 
economically developed countries …; 
[2] the treaty counterparty is a significant existing or future destination for 
Australia‘s outbound investment …; or 
[3] the counterparty presses strongly for [ISDS] due to its own general policy 
… and/or concerns about risks for its investors in Australia … .‘197  
 
The first factor, which is arguably the major factor, entails taking into account the 
protection that would be available to Australia‘s investments in the country that 
Australia intends to sign a treaty with (counterparty). This basically entails 
considering the national legal system of the counterparty in order to assess whether 
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or not it falls below international best standards and would, thus, not protect 
Australia‘s investments (investors).198 A principal consideration in this assessment is 
the level of economic development of the counterparty.199 There is seemingly an 
assumption that developing countries do not have robust legal systems that would 
offer the necessary protection to Australia‘s investments, and that the opposite holds 
true for developed countries. As such, Australia takes into account whether the 
counterparty is a developed or developing country when conducting the treaty-by-
treaty assessment. This issue is explored in more detail in chapter four.  
 
The second factor that Australia takes into account in conducting the treaty-by-treaty 
assessment is whether the counterparty is a significant (existing or future) 
destination for Australia‘s outbound investments.200 Thus, the Australian Government 
negotiates for inclusion of ISDS provisions in treaties where Australia is a net FDI 
exporter and advocates not to include them in investment treaties where Australia is 
a net FDI importer.201 This means that Australia, in a way, acknowledges the 
negative repercussions that ISDS provisions would have in Australia and therefore 
refrains from including them where the counterparty has comparatively more 
investments in Australia, as this raises the probability of investors from the 
counterparty initiating ISDS claims against Australia. On the other hand, Australia 
does not mind subjecting the counterparty to ISDS claims initiated by its outbound 
investors as it negotiates for inclusion of ISDS provisions where there are 
comparatively more Australian investments in the counterparty. This factor is, 
therefore, one sided in favour of Australia as its sole purpose is to protect Australia 
against the potential consequences of ISDS provisions while exposing its 
counterparty to the same.  
 
The third factor that Australia takes into account in conducting the treaty-by-treaty 
assessment is how much the counterparty presses strongly for inclusion of ISDS 
provisions due to the counterparty‘s own general policy and/or concerns about risks 
for its investors in Australia.202 For instance, Australia‘s Parliamentary records 
indicate that a major reason for including ISDS provisions in the FTA with Korea 
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(despite being a developed country) was the insistence by the Korean 
government.203 The pressure from the counterparty is balanced with lobbying by 
Australia‘s business sector involved in outbound investment in the counterparty‘s 
country.204  
 
Since the introduction of the treaty-by-treaty approach in Australia, Australia has 
entered into treaties with Korea, China and Japan.205 As stated above, ISDS 
provisions have been included in treaties with Korea and China, but not with 
Japan.206 Accordingly, ISDS provisions have not been included in the treaty with 
Japan as it is a developed country with a robust domestic legal system.207 China has 
been regarded as a less developed country in this regard and therefore required the 
inclusion of ISDS provisions.208 As stated above, Korea insisted on the inclusion of 
ISDS provisions despite being a developed country.209  Australia is also a party to 
the Trans-pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA), a multilateral FTA involving 12 
countries (some of which are developing countries), which was signed on 4 February 
2016 and currently awaits ratification.210  The TPPA also includes ISDS provisions, 
and Australia reportedly resisted signing the TPPA on the basis of protecting its 
policy space.211 These treaties demonstrate the treaty-by-treaty approach in practice. 
Some of the advantages and disadvantages of this approach are discussed in 
chapter four. 
 
 3.5. CONCLUSION 
Chapter three has analysed how Australia adopted its current policy of including 
ISDS provisions in its treaties on a treaty-by-treaty assessment, and also how 
Australia conducts the treaty-by-treaty assessment in practice. The chapter starts by 
giving a brief background of some of the main issues that exacerbated the ISDS 
debate in Australia and the subsequent government policy shifts on ISDS policy. 
                                                          
203
 Nottage L (2016) 5.  
204
 Kurtz & Nottage (2015) 479. 
205
 Kurtz & Nottage (2015) 468. 
206
 Kurtz & Nottage (2015) 468. 
207
 Nottage L (2016) 4. 
208
 Nottage L (2016) 22. 
209
 Nottage L (2016) 5. 
210
 Perera & Demeter (2012) 82. 
211
 Perera & Demeter (2012) 82.  
 
 
 
 
36 
 
These issues include the coming into force of the TPP laws, the Phillip Morris case 
and the Productivity Commission Report.  
 
This chapter has further discussed how the ISDS policy shifts in Australia have 
largely depended on the political party that is in government. While the Labour party 
advocates for abrogation of ISDS, the Liberal Party opts to include ISDS provisions 
on a treaty-by-treaty approach.  
 
The chapter has also analysed the factors that guide the treaty-by-treaty approach. 
These are the capability of the counterparty‘s domestic legal system to protect 
Australian investments, the level of Australia‘s outbound investments in the 
counterparty, and the counterparty‘s own ISDS policy.  
 
The next chapter is built upon the ISDS solutions that have been implemented by 
RSA and Australia respectively, as discussed in chapters two and three. It analyses 
the strengths and weaknesses of the ISDS solutions as implemented by RSA and 
Australia, and also analyses how these solutions relate to some internationally 
recognised solutions to ISDS problems.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF SOLUTIONS IMPLEMENTED BY THE 
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA AND AUSTRALIA RESPECTIVELY 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter four critically analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the two solutions to 
ISDS as implemented by RSA and Australia respectively. First, the chapter critically 
analyses the solution implemented by RSA. In particular, it critically analyses the 
strengths and weaknesses of the avenues for resolving investment disputes that 
have been put in place by the PI Act. Secondly, the chapter critically analyses the 
solution implemented by Australia to include ISDS in its treaties on a treaty-by-treaty 
approach. This includes a critique of the criteria that Australia uses to implement the 
treaty-by-treaty approach. This critique is linked with, among other issues, a 
discussion of the effects of the solutions implemented by RSA and Australia 
respectively on both FDI and outward investments for a country, the relevance of 
level of economic development of a country when considering solutions to ISDS, and 
an inquiry as to whether including ISDS provisions in treaties increases FDI for a 
country. Finally, the chapter examines the solutions to ISDS that are internationally 
recognised and have been suggested as solutions to the ISDS conundrum by 
international bodies such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD).  
 
4.2. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AVENUES UNDER THE PROTECTION OF 
INVESTMENT ACT 
The PI Act allows investors to resort to mediation, competent courts, independent 
tribunals, statutory bodies within RSA, and state-state arbitration upon exhaustion of 
domestic remedies.212 The term investor under the PI Act is not limited to foreign 
investors.213 This presupposes that even RSA investors are entitled to utilise these 
dispute settlement mechanisms. The following section critically analyses each of the 
dispute settlement avenues under the PI Act. 
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4.3. USE OF DOMESTIC COURTS  
An investor who has a dispute with RSA government concerning an investment may 
approach any competent court in RSA.214 The issue whether domestic courts are 
appropriate forums for resolving investment disputes has been a matter of debate.215 
Generally, host-states have a preference to resolve investment disputes using their 
domestic courts, rather than resorting to ISDS.216 Various reasons support this 
preference. Some of the reasons include protecting national sovereignty unlike 
subjecting themselves to supranational authorities through ISDS,217 promotion of 
capacity of the domestic courts through experience the courts gain from handling the 
investment cases,218 and, more importantly, to avoid unpredictable international 
challenges to legitimate, constitutional and democratic policy-making.219  
 
On the other hand, investors prefer to have their investment disputes resolved 
through ISDS.220 The concern that investors have regarding domestic courts is the 
possibility of facing a deficient domestic court system that may be prejudiced or 
systematically favour the host-state government.221 It is further argued that courts 
cannot encroach on the powers of the executive and legislative arms of government 
unless the latter have acted irrationally, or have unreasonably or unjustifiably limited 
constitutional rights.222 This paper agrees that these concerns by foreign investors 
about domestic courts favouring a host government vis-à-vis a foreign investor have 
merit. Even though independence of the judiciary from other branches of government 
and any other external pressures is a basic feature of any domestic court system in a 
                                                          
214
 Section 13(4) of the PI Act.  
215
 Ngwenya M The Promotion and Protection of Foreign Investment in South Africa: A Critical Review 
of Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill 2013 (unpublished Doctor of Laws thesis, University of 
South Africa (2015) 117 (hereafter Ngwenya M (2015)).  
216
 Cremades BM & Cairns DJA ‗Contract and Treaty Claims and Choice of Forum in Foreign 
Investment Disputes‘ in Horn N (ed) Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes: Procedural and 
Substantive Legal Aspects (2004) 345 (hereafter Cremades BM & Cairns DJA (2004)).  
217
 Cremades BM & Cairns DJA (2004) 345.  
218
 Franck SD ‗Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and the Rule of Law‘ (2007) 
19 McGeorge Global Business and Development Law Journal 367 (hereafter Franck SD (2007)). 
219
 Carim X Lessons from RSA‘s BIT Review (2013) 1. 
220
 Norton JJ ‗An Environmental Approach to FDI and Effective Dispute Resolution: The Exhortation of 
the Monterrey Consensus‘ in Horn N (ed) Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes: Procedural and 
Substantive Legal Aspects (2004) 103 (hereafter Norton JJ (2004)). 
221
 Norton JJ (2004) 103.   
222
 Anglo American SA Limited submission in ‗Summary of Submissions for the Promotion and 
Protection of Investment Bill (PPIB) [B18-2015]‘ 59 available at 
https://www.thedti.gov.za/parliament/2015/Summar_Matrix.pdf (accessed 1 December 2016) 
(hereafter Anglo American SA Limited‘s submission on PPIB).   
 
 
 
 
39 
 
democratic society,223 the judiciary remains an organ of the host-state. It has an 
inherent duty to serve and protect the interests of the state. Where there are 
competing interests between a foreign investor and national public policy, it is 
reasonable that a foreign investor would be concerned with whether the domestic 
court system would be impartial.  
 
Another concern by investors regarding the use of domestic court systems is that 
some national legal systems, particularly in developing countries, lack the requisite 
capacity to handle investment disputes.224 For instance, it is argued that the delay in 
conclusion of ligation cases in most Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) countries has been a cause for concern.225 The American Department of 
State has stated that domestic courts of some SADC Member States face various 
challenges which may affect their efficiency and attractiveness to investors.226 The 
World Bank Doing Business Rankings of 2016 (the Rankings) show that, generally, 
most developing countries rank low on enforcement of contracts.227 Nevertheless, 
the Rankings also show that some countries with lower levels of income rank better 
than some countries with higher levels of income in terms of enforcement of 
contracts.228 This means that it is not conclusive that all lower income countries fare 
badly when it comes to enforcement of contracts as compared to higher income 
countries. This argument can be extended to the capacity of domestic courts in 
developing countries to handle investment disputes. Thus, it would be an inaccurate 
generalisation to conclude that domestic courts in all developing countries lack the 
requisite capacity and efficiency to handle investment disputes. Rather each 
country‘s capacity should be considered on its own merit.  
 
In the case of RSA, Dr Rob Davies argues that it matters little that the PI Act 
excludes recourse to ISDS and instead gives jurisdiction over investment disputes to 
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RSA domestic courts.229 He further argues that RSA‘s domestic courts ‗fare very well 
in terms of their capacity to enforce contracts‘ and that RSA is ‗a specialised 
commercial jurisdiction with efficient and well-capacitated legal professionals and an 
independent judiciary.‘230 The RSA government argues that its domestic legal 
processes are robust, that the RSA Constitution is one of the most progressive in the 
world, and that the domestic courts are independent. 231 As such, the position of RSA 
government is that an investor whose rights have been infringed would have 
requisite local legal remedies available. It is argued that RSA courts generally 
function well in commercial matters and still have a significant degree of institutional 
independence.232 The United States Investment Climate Statement of 2016 has 
indicated that United States investors find RSA domestic courts generally fair and 
consistent and that infrastructure is well-developed.233  
 
On the other hand, it has been argued that the Bench in RSA domestic courts has 
been weakened by a number of poor appointments since 1994.234 These 
appointments have eroded business confidence in the capacity of the courts to 
decide complex commercial cases, and that there has always been limited 
commercial experience within the Constitutional Court.235 The South African Institute 
of Race Relations (IRR) has further argued that the African National Congress 
(ANC), which has been the national ruling party since 1994, has expressed an 
intention to bring the Judiciary under the control of its party.236 The alleged political 
interference with the Judiciary, if successful, would undermine its autonomy and 
independence.237 The IRR further argues that some of the rulings of the 
Constitutional Court on contentious political or transformation issues important to the 
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ANC have clearly been executive-minded.238 One of the case examples that have 
been cited in this regard is the Constitutional Court‘s ruling in the case of Agri South 
Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy (the Agri SA case).239 This case is briefly 
discussed later in this paper.  
 
Even though the allegations of inadequacy and partiality of RSA‘s domestic court 
system have been echoed elsewhere,240 the source of the allegations seems to be 
IRR itself.241 Further, the allegations by IRR do not explain how the case examples it 
has cited have been partial. Conversely, this paper argues that these allegations are 
not supported by sufficient evidence. Further, this paper subscribes to the position 
advanced by Maupin and Langford that ‗in view of the current level of commercial 
litigation routinely taking place within [RSA] courts,‘ RSA domestic courts ‗can now 
offer fair and prompt protection of the economic rights of foreign investors.‘242  
 
4.4. CHALLENGING PUBLIC POLICY IN DOMESTIC COURTS 
This section of the paper argues that abrogating ISDS and restricting investment 
disputes to domestic courts would not necessarily stop investors from challenging 
public policy regulations which affect their investments, because investors can still 
lodge their claims in the domestic courts. This is clear, for example, in the cases of 
International SA v Commonwealth of Australia and British American Tobacco 
Australasia Limited and ORS v The Commonwealth of Australia discussed in chapter 
three. A similar example in RSA is the Agri SA case, in which the claimant claimed 
that its mineral rights had been expropriated by the MPRD Act.243 The case was 
commenced at the North Gauteng High Court and went all the way to the 
Constitutional Court of RSA. The claim was dismissed by the Constitutional Court as 
it found that no expropriation had taken place.244 This claim is similar to the claim 
made in the Foresti case, discussed in chapter two.245‘ 
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The point here is that laws or regulations enacted as part of public policy that are 
challenged through ISDS can also be challenged in domestic courts. One can, 
therefore, argue that abrogating ISDS and redirecting investment disputes to 
domestic courts does not necessarily stop investors from challenging laws that are 
implemented as part of public policy. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that in all 
the case examples cited in this paper, the domestic courts dismissed the 
expropriation claims. This shows that domestic courts are more vigilant in protecting 
the nation‘s public policy regulations. This also buttresses an argument made in the 
previous section of this paper that the judiciary is an organ of the host state, which 
has an inherent duty to serve and protect the interests of the nation.  
 
4.5. MEDIATING INVESTMENT DISPUTES  
Aside from pursuing an investment claim in RSA‘s domestic courts as discussed in 
the preceding sections, investors in RSA also have an option of pursuing their claims 
through mediation.246 Chapter two has discussed the procedure to be followed in 
conducting the mediation in terms of the PI Act.247 This procedure shall be 
complemented by the Draft Regulations which have recently been published for 
public comment.248  
 
The mediation process as provided for in the PPI Bill was heavily criticised for, inter 
alia, the criteria for appointment of a mediator as it was left entirely within the 
prerogative of the Minister of Trade and Industry.249 However, it is evident that the PI 
Act has rectified the shortfalls as these no longer appear in the current version of the 
PI Act. One aspect that has not been sufficiently rectified by the PI Act despite 
criticism is the lack of time limits within which each step in the mediation process 
ought to be completed.250 The only time limit provided is the requirement that the 
investor must request for mediation within six months from becoming aware of the 
dispute.251 The PI Act does not go further to provide for time limits for the other steps 
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in the mediation process. Time limits are necessary in mediation in order to avoid 
delays in resolution of disputes. However, this shortfall shall, seemingly, be rectified 
should the Draft Regulations come into force. The Draft Regulations contain several 
time limits that cover various steps within the mediation process. For instance, a 
mediator ought to be appointed within ten days of receipt of a respondent‘s 
response,252 and that the mediator should appoint a date and venue for the 
mediation hearing within ten days of accepting the role of mediator.253 The various 
time limits contained in the Draft Regulations should go a long way in improving 
efficiency of the mediation process.    
 
The Draft Regulations acknowledge that in some instances mediation may fail to 
resolve some investment disputes, in which case the mediation process would be 
terminated or closed.254 However, the Draft Regulations fail to indicate what should 
happen to the investment dispute in that case. Thus, it is not clear whether or not this 
qualifies as exhaustion of domestic remedies. This issue is particularly important 
because the PI Act has not indicated whether or not the various domestic avenues 
for resolving investment disputes are in a hierarchy, or whether or not recourse to 
one or more of the domestic avenues is sufficient to qualify as exhaustion of 
domestic remedies, which then qualifies an investor to request for state-state 
arbitration. It is hoped that the DTI shall clarify this issue when reviewing the Draft 
Regulations.  
 
The above notwithstanding, for over a decade, stakeholders and commentators have 
lauded mediation as a potential alternative process for resolving international 
investment disputes.255 Several advantages of mediation have been identified in this 
regard. First, it is argued that mediators set a tone and atmosphere that is conducive 
to cooperation and information sharing, asking questions to discover the parties' 
underlying interests and expose unsupported assumptions, and introducing effective 
procedures for generating and evaluating options for settlement.256 Thus, mediation 
offers the opportunity for parties to discuss not only their legal but also extra-legal 
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issues and interests. These may include ‗domestic political realities, regional 
concerns, and protection of important community norms or characteristics.‘257 This 
paper argues that these features are appropriately suited to the investment disputes 
as the host-state‘s public policy concerns can more readily be articulated and 
understood through this approach. 
 
Another advantage of mediation, which incidentally flows from the amicable 
environment created at mediation, is the likelihood to preserve or even strengthen 
the relationship between the investor and the host-state. This is beneficial to both 
parties. Investors who have illiquid capital in the host-state that are virtually 
permanent, and on the other hand, host-states that rely on FDI for economic 
development may especially be interested in maintaining this cordial relationship.258 
 
Some criticisms have also been levelled upon using mediation to resolve investment 
disputes. One of the criticisms that this paper finds more valid derives from the fact 
that most states operate through large and inefficient bureaucracies. As such, the 
internal negotiations among state officials, agencies, and even local units of 
government to reach consensus on settlement authority may be significantly difficult 
and time-consuming.259 This may not only cause massive delays but also render 
mediation of investment disputes impracticable and undesirable.260  
 
It is argued that mediation and other consensual processes are already being used 
regularly to resolve domestic public policy and major regulatory disputes that involve 
extraordinarily difficult public and private issues and state actors.261 Further, 
domestic and international experience shows that many investors and states are 
already familiar with mediation as a process for resolving legal disputes.262 The 
recourse to mediation for resolving investment disputes, therefore, does not come as 
a far-fetched alternative to ISDS. It is an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 
                                                          
257
 Welsh NA & Schneider AK ‗The Thoughtful Integration of Mediation into Bilateral Investment 
Treaty Arbitration‘ (2013) 18 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 108 (hereafter Welsh NA & Schneider 
AK (2013)). 
258
 Mediation of Investor-State Conflicts (2014) 2555. 
259
 Welsh NA & Schneider AK (2013) 87. 
260
 Mediation of Investor-State Conflicts (2014) 2557. 
261
 Welsh NA & Schneider AK (2013) 88. 
262
 Welsh NA & Schneider AK (2013) 90. 
 
 
 
 
45 
 
technique that has been tried and tested. It is submitted that the provision for 
mediation in the PI Act will go long way as a good alternative to ISDS.  
 
4.6. RESOLVING INVESTMENT DISPUTES BY STATE-STATE ARBITRATION 
As stated above, the PI Act also allows investors to pursue the possibility of state-
state arbitration upon exhaustion of the domestic remedies.263 State-state arbitration 
is where a dispute is settled by arbitration between the host-state and the home-
state of an investor.264 State–state arbitration exercised by an investor‘s home-state 
on behalf of the investor forms part of diplomatic protection under international 
law.265 State-state arbitration is not new to investment disputes settlement. For 
instance, the Australia-USA FTA discussed in chapter three uses state-state 
arbitration as one of the mechanisms for resolving investment disputes.266 Several 
RSA treaties also contain state-state arbitration mechanisms.267 It is argued that one 
of the solutions to the ISDS conundrum could be to solely rely on state-state 
arbitration.268  
 
The PI Act has imposed several conditions that ought to be satisfied in order for an 
investor to resort to state-state arbitration. First, an investor has to exhaust the 
domestic remedies available under the PI Act.269 This means that an investor must 
first pursue its claim either at the domestic courts, mediation or independent tribunal 
or statutory body before pursuing state-state arbitration. The PI Act does not, 
however, provide how long the dispute must have subsisted in the domestic avenues 
before it can be taken for state-state arbitration. This exposes investors to potential 
delays that may happen in the course of pursuing the domestic avenues. It is argued 
that time-limits need to be imposed within which a dispute must be resolved using 
domestic courts failing which the investor could initiate the state-state arbitration 
process.270 Further, as stated above, the PI Act needs to clarify whether or not the 
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domestic remedies are in a hierarchy or whether one or more domestic remedies 
ought to be resorted to before the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies 
can be said to be satisfied.  
 
The condition for exhaustion of domestic remedies is accompanied by another 
requirement that an investor may pursue state-state arbitration only if RSA 
government consents to it.271 It is argued that access to state-state arbitration should 
not be subject to the consent of the government because it gives the government a 
prerogative to deny consent,272 for reasons including diplomatic relations between 
RSA government and the home-state. If the government withholds its consent, that 
would mean the end of the claim for the investor. This requirement, therefore, leaves 
this avenue for resolving investment disputes solely in the discretion of RSA 
government, which may not be fair for the investors.  
 
The investors‘ right to state-state arbitration seems to be protected by the 
administrative processes as set out in section 6 of the PI Act.273  These 
administrative processes include the right to be given written reasons and 
administrative review of the decision by the government, consistent with section 33 
of RSA Constitution.274 This paper argues that this grants an investor a right to 
challenge the government through judicial review of the decision to withhold its 
consent to conduct state-state arbitration. As such, even though the government 
retains the discretion to consent to state-state arbitration, its exercise of this 
discretion must be lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair,275 otherwise, it may be 
challenged.   
 
Another problem that has been cited with state-state arbitration is that it leaves the 
investor at the mercy of its government (the home-state) to agree to take up the 
claim on the investor‘s behalf. The investor has to lobby its government to institute a 
claim. It is not guaranteed that the home-state government would agree to pursue 
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the arbitration proceedings.276 A home state may not always be willing to take up 
state-state arbitration against another government for reasons related to diplomatic 
relations.277   
 
As stated earlier in this section, state–state arbitration forms part of diplomatic 
protection under international law.‘278 It is, thus, argued that state-state arbitration is 
already available to all investors subject to the rules of customary international 
law,279 notwithstanding the PI Act. Under customary international law, the 
requirements of exhaustion of domestic remedies and consent by the home-state 
also exist.280 It is the requirement for RSA government to consent to state-state 
arbitration that is seemingly different from ordinary diplomatic protection procedure. 
This paper argues that the consent requirement may serve an important purpose for 
RSA in that it retains the option of submitting to state-state arbitration only where the 
government deems it appropriate. However, as stated above, this discretion ought to 
be exercised in a lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair manner.  
 
It is unclear what mechanisms and procedures will govern state-state arbitration of 
investment disputes in RSA, what body will conduct the arbitration and what rules 
will apply.281 Perhaps this information would be contained in the PI Regulations that 
would be promulgated under section 14 of the PI Act. It is important that RSA 
government clarifies these issues.  
 
4.7. CONFLICT WITH THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY 
PROTOCOL ON FINANCE AND INVESTMENT 
RSA‘s move to abrogate ISDS may be in conflict with the Southern African 
Development Community Protocol on Finance and Investment (SADC FIP Protocol). 
In terms of the SADC FIP Protocol either an investor or a host-state may refer any 
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investment dispute to ISDS.282 This right is subject to exhaustion of domestic 
remedies and also after the expiration of at least 6 months from written notification of 
the claim.283 RSA is a member of SADC and also a signatory of the SADC FIP 
Protocol.284 The provisions of the SADC FIP Protocol, including the requirement to 
submit to ISDS, are therefore binding on RSA. It is, therefore, argued that abrogating 
ISDS is inconsistent with the SADC FIP Protocol.285 It is also argued that this means 
that an investor is still entitled to invoke the SADC FIP Protocol and commence ISDS 
proceedings against RSA.286  
 
DTI‘s response on this issue has been brief. It has stated that comments relating to 
the SADC FIP Protocol are confidential as it is pending Summit approval.287 The DTI 
has further stated that ‗certain provisions of the dispute settlement process [in the 
SADC FIP Protocol] have been amended‘ and that reference to international 
arbitration has now been excluded and that member states must give investors the 
right of access to courts and tribunals in line with relevant host-states‘ domestic laws 
in their respective jurisdictions.288 It is, however, unclear whether the said 
amendment of the SADC FIP Protocol will indeed align with the PI Act.289 That 
notwithstanding, in the current state of the SADC FIP Protocol, the PI Act does not 
comply with the SADC FIP Protocol.  
 
4.8. PROS AND CONS OF THE TREATY-BY-TREATY APPROACH 
Chapter three briefly discussed the criteria utilised by Australia when implementing 
the treaty-by-treaty approach. This section builds on that discussion. As observed in 
chapter three, the first criterion proceeds on a sweeping assumption that national 
legal systems of developing countries fall below international best standards and that 
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the opposite holds true for developed countries.290 This argument has already been 
explored further earlier in this chapter,291 the ultimate argument being that each 
country‘s national legal system has to be analysed individually rather than 
proceeding on a sweeping assumption that national legal systems in developing 
countries lack the capacity to handle investment disputes.  
 
Another weakness with this criterion is that it denies an opportunity to states with 
weaker legal systems to improve their capacity. 292 This happens because when a 
developed country opines that there are perceived problems with the domestic legal 
system of the counterparty, it insists on including ISDS provisions in the treaty.293 It 
is argued that the focus should rather be on how the developed country can assist 
the developing country to reform and improve its national legal system.294 The 
Productivity Commission commented on this issue as follows:  
 
‗if perceptions of problems with a foreign country‘s legal system are sufficient 
to discourage investment in that country, a bilateral arrangement with 
Australia to provide a ―preferential legal system‖ (ISDS) for Australian 
investors is unlikely to generate the same benefits for that country than if its 
legal system was developed on a domestic non-preferential basis. To the 
extent that secure legal systems facilitate investment in a similar way that 
customs and port procedures facilitate goods trade, there may be a role for 
developed nations to assist through legal capacity building to develop stable 
and transparent legal and judicial frameworks. While not an immediate 
solution, over time such capacity building goes towards addressing the 
underlying problem, and provides benefits not only for foreign investors 
(including Australian investors), but all participants in the domestic 
economy.‘295  
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4.9. ROLE OF OUTWARD INVESTMENTS IN THE TREATY-BY-TREATY 
APPROACH 
As discussed in chapter three, the second criterion on which Australia bases the 
treaty-by-treaty approach is whether the treaty counterparty is a significant existing 
or future destination for Australia‘s outward investments.296 The essence of this 
criterion is that the Australian Government negotiates for inclusion of ISDS 
provisions in treaties where Australia is a net FDI exporter and advocates for not 
including them in investment treaties where Australia is a net FDI importer.297 If 
treaties with counterparties where Australia is a net FDI exporter include ISDS 
provisions, that enables Australian investors that have invested in the counterparty 
countries to pursue ISDS claims against the counterparties. That way the investors 
feel more protected. Conversely, if treaties with counterparties where Australia is a 
net FDI importer do not include ISDS provisions, that reduces the chances of 
Australia facing ISDS claims. This paper argues that this criterion is clearly biased as 
it essentially aims at protecting Australia from ISDS claims while exposing other 
countries (Australia‘s counterparties) to ISDS claims by Australian investors.  
 
Generally, it is argued that much discussion of ISDS policy seemingly overlooks 
protection of outward investments as the arguments focus on protecting public policy 
from inbound investors‘ claim.298 When national policies focus their investment 
policies on ensuring that inbound investors do not bring ISDS claims against their 
governments, they normally neglect the importance of ISDS in protecting outward 
investors. This leaves the outward investors at risk.299 This argument is applicable to 
RSA and the PI Act. The PI Act aims at protecting the interests of inward investors in 
RSA. RSA‘s outward investors are not being protected by the PI Act as it is a 
domestic legislation.  
 
4.10. INFLUENCE OF OUTWARD INVESTMENTS ON A COUNTRY’S INVESTOR-
STATE ARBITRATION POLICY 
This paper argues that outward investments in a country have a bigger role to play in 
determining a country‘s ISDS policy than it is often stated. This paper further argues 
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that countries that have high outward investment stand to benefit more from 
including ISDS provisions in a treaty as it increases protection for their outbound 
investors. Conversely, countries that have low outward investment have little benefit 
from ISDS because chances are high that their investors would never utilise ISDS.  
Australia‘s investment pattern in recent years has recorded a major shift resulting 
from an increase in outward investment. Currently, outward investment is considered 
an important characteristic of Australia‘s international economic profile.300 In 2013, 
Australia‘s stock of outward investment totalled US$ 1,600,000,000,000,000.00 
(US$1.6 Trillion) and was ranked world‘s 18th largest source of direct investment.301 
It is, therefore, expected that Australia would be inclined towards a policy that retains 
ISDS provisions in its treaties rather than abrogating it, so as to protect its outward 
investments.  
 
On the other hand, RSA‘s level of outward investment as of 2014 stood at US$ 
6,900,000,000,000.00 (US$6.9 Billion).302 Despite being the highest in Africa,303 
RSA‘s level of outward investment comes nowhere near that of Australia. Similarly, 
the level of outward investments for developing countries and least developed 
countries is much lower than most developed countries.304 This paper argues that 
such developing countries and least developed countries are less likely to benefit 
from ISDS provisions as they do not have much outward investments to protect.  
 
Despite having little outward investment to protect, developing countries are major 
FDI recipients. In 2014, developing countries accounted for 55% of FDI inflows.305 
This exposes them to a higher risk ISDS claims than developed countries. Statistics 
actually show that developing countries have comparatively been defendants in 
more ISDS claims than developed countries.306 Further, historical trends show that 
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investors from developed countries have been the main users of ISDS, accounting 
for 80 per cent of all known IDS claims.307 This leaves developing countries in a 
position where they are not benefiting much from ISDS and at the same time they 
are being negatively affected more by ISDS. Hence, a country‘s policy decision on 
whether or not to include ISDS should take into account its level of outward 
investment, which would normally be synonymous to its level of economic 
development.  
 
4.11. INFLUENCE OF INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT ON FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT 
The preceding section has explored a perspective that argues that developing 
countries benefit less from including ISDS provisions in treaties when compared with 
developed countries. This section explores a counterargument that having ISDS 
provisions in treaties boosts FDI inflows for a country,308 and as such developing 
countries would benefit more from FDI if they have ISDS in place for foreign 
investors.309 A debate has ensued as to whether there is a direct correlation between 
including ISDS provisions in a treaty and the level of FDI for a country.310 There is 
seemingly an absence of empirical evidence analysing this relationship.311 However, 
there is a rich body of research on the relationship between FDI and BITs, many of 
which include ISDS provisions as a key component.312 It is argued that looking at the 
relationship between BITs and FDI can give insights into the likely effects of ISDS on 
FDI.313 According to UNCTAD, empirical studies on the relationship between BITs 
and FDI show mixed results.314 UNCTAD recognises that while a majority of the 
studies conclude that BITs have a positive impact on FDI, some empirical studies 
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show no effect of BITs on FDI.315 The main argument that UNCTAD advances in this 
regard is that BITs are simply one of the several determinants of FDI, and that they 
cannot substitute the importance of host-state conditions, which include sound 
domestic policies, regulatory and institutional frameworks, quality of institutions, the 
level of political risk, or the development of the financial sector. 316 
 
The foregoing discussion shows that it is not conclusive that having ISDS provisions 
increases FDI for a country. Similarly, it is not conclusive that not having ISDS 
decreases FDI in a country. This paper argues that is it not conclusive that 
abrogating ISDS would negatively affect FDI in a country. Rather, what affects FDI is 
the totality of prevailing host-state conditions as stated by UNCTAD (in the preceding 
paragraph). An analysis of the other host-state conditions is, however, beyond the 
scope of this paper. Nevertheless, abrogating ISDS alone does not spell doom for 
FDI prospects in RSA. What matters more is that RSA should properly implement 
the alternative avenues to ISDS, taking into account the shortfalls of the avenues 
discussed throughout this paper.   
 
4.12. INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED ALTERNATIVES TO INVESTOR-STATE 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT  
As stated in chapter one, various countries are currently preoccupied with reforming 
their ISDS regimes.317 ISDS has also become a subject of debate in many 
international organisations. One international organisation that has taken a lead on 
this issue is UNCTAD. UNCTAD is an intergovernmental body that was established 
by the United Nations General Assembly in 1964.318 In 2012, it published the 
Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development (IPFSD).319 The current 
version of the IPFSD, IPFSD 2015, pools global expertise in the investment and 
development fields from other international organisations, international experts, 
academics and other investment-development stakeholders.320 Since the launch of 
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IPFSD in 2012, a large number of countries and groupings have used it to review 
and revise their national investment laws and policies.321 
 
One of the salient issues in the IPFSD 2015 is ISDS. The IPFSD 2015 
acknowledges that the very nature of the IIA‘s standards of protection place limits on 
government‘s regulatory freedom, and to the extent that the foreign investors 
perceive that domestic policy changes negatively affect their expectations, they may 
challenge the policy changes through ISDS.322 The IPFSD 2015, therefore, proposes 
several recommendations (solutions) on how countries can safeguard their interests 
and protect themselves from ISDS problems. The recommendations proposed by 
IPFSD 2015 show that there is no single acceptable solution to the problem; rather 
there are various solutions available which different countries can implement 
according to their respective circumstances. 
 
The first solution that the IPFSD 2015 proposes is for countries to carefully craft the 
IIAs and clarify the scope and meaning of vague substantive provisions such as fair 
and equitable treatment standard and expropriation. In this regard, each country 
should strive to achieve the right balance between protecting foreign investments 
and maintaining policy space for domestic regulation in accordance with each 
country‘s development strategy.323 This proposal is important because countries 
have different development agendas. For instance, RSA‘s development agenda 
highly considers uplifting the HDSAs,324 while Australia is concerned with curbing the 
smoking problem in the country.325 It is, therefore, expected that countries may 
implement different solutions to ISDS which fit their respective developmental 
strategies.  
 
The solution to carefully craft IIA provisions is also particularly important because, as 
stated in chapter one, the ISDS problems are not just limited to infringing on host 
state public policy space (which is the focus of this paper). The ISDS system has 
also been criticised for other shortfalls.326 The solution to carefully craft substantive 
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provisions can, therefore, take into account the individual problems that each country 
is facing and draft its treaty provisions in order to avert the problems in future. New 
generation treaties, including the TPPA, seem to be adopting this approach.327 
Countries can also implement this approach by defining or circumscribing the range 
of disputes that can be subject to ISDS under the treaty.328 For instance, by 
specifying that only disputes arising out of specifically listed documents like IIAs, 
contracts or investment authorisations can be brought to ISDS.329 This can also be 
achieved by excluding certain sensitive areas from ISDS or listing those issues to 
which ISDS applies.330 For instance, RSA would exclude from ISDS all regulations 
that emanate from BEE policies.   
 
The IPFSD 2015 also suggests reserving a state‘s consent to arbitration so that it 
would need to be given separately for each specific dispute.331 The host-states could 
therefore specifically indicate in the treaty that they reserve the right to consent to 
ISDS. This way, where a host state genuinely opines that the envisaged ISDS claim 
would infringe upon its public policy space, it would withhold its consent.  
 
The IPFSD 2015 also proposes that countries could choose to omit ISDS provisions 
altogether.332 Several treaties have since omitted ISDS provisions, including some 
Australian treaties.333 RSA has also excluded ISDS altogether, although it has done 
it differently by enacting the PI Act. This shows that the solution adopted by RSA, of 
excluding ISDS, is also internationally recognised as one of the solutions to ISDS.  
 
Another dimension of the solutions concerns improvements to the institutional nature 
and implementing alternatives to ISDS system. One of the ways this can be done is 
by introducing an appeals facility to undertake a substantive review of the ISDS 
tribunals‘ decisions.334 For instance, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
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Agreement between the European Union and Canada (CETA) has included 
provisions on an investment court system and an appellate mechanism under which 
the legal correctness of arbitral decisions could be challenged.335 The IPSFD 2015 
has also suggested replacing the system of multiple ad hoc arbitral tribunals with a 
standing international investment court competent to hear all investment disputes, 
with judges elected or appointed by states on a permanent basis and with an 
appeals chamber.336 This suggestion has seemingly received much support. It has 
been suggested that the investment court can be modelled on the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) dispute resolution body.337 The proposal to establish an 
investment court for ISDS has also become an important point of discussion within 
the European Union.338 Nevertheless, as stated in the introduction, this paper is 
rather interested in the steps that countries should / can take as immediate solutions 
to the ISDS conundrum rather than solutions of an institutional nature.  
 
Finally, the IPSFD 2015 has suggested promoting the use of ADR methods including 
conciliation or mediation,339 and also resorting to state-state arbitration. It is 
suggested that state-state arbitration can be provided as the only international 
means to resolving investment disputes,340 with domestic avenues available to all 
investors.341 The PI Act has largely followed this approach. This buttresses the 
argument made in this paper that RSA‘s solution generally conforms to 
internationally recognised solutions to ISDS.  
 
This is not an exhaustive discussion of all solutions to ISDS that countries can 
implement. It simply highlights some of the common solutions that countries have 
implemented. Other solutions, not discussed in this paper, also exist.  
 
4.13. CONCLUSION 
This chapter, first, discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the dispute settlement 
avenues for investment disputes provided the PI Act. These are domestic courts, 
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mediation and state-state dispute settlement upon exhaustion of domestic avenues. 
Among other arguments, this chapter argues that foreign investors are inevitably 
concerned about the potential bias that domestic courts systems may have in favour 
of policies enacted for public policy. The chapter has also dispelled the sweeping 
notion that national legal systems of developing countries lack the capacity to handle 
investment disputes. Rather, each country should be considered according to its own 
merits. In this regard, it has been argued that RSA‘s domestic courts possess the 
requisite capacity to handle investment disputes. A further argument that investors 
may also challenge public policy space in the domestic courts has also been 
explored in this chapter. 
 
The chapter also argues that both mediation and state-state arbitration are potential 
and acceptable alternative avenues to ISDS. However, these avenues as 
implemented by the PI Act also have their own shortfalls. For instance, the 
requirement by RSA to consent to state-state arbitration is problematic. Further, this 
chapter has highlighted that RSA‘s solution to abrogate ISDS may be in conflict with 
the SADC FIP Protocol.  
 
The chapter has also analysed the pros and cons of the criteria used by Australia in 
implementing the treaty-by-treaty approach. The criterion that if a country‘s national 
legal system is considered weak then ISDS provisions should be included in the 
treaty with that country has a consequence of denying that county an opportunity to 
develop capacity of its legal system. The criterion to consider a country‘s outward 
investments used by Australia has brought out one of the main arguments in this 
paper, which is that including ISDS provisions in treaties is more beneficial to 
countries with high outward investments (often developed countries), whilst it is more 
detrimental to countries that have little outward investments (often developing and 
least developed countries). 
 
This chapter has also analysed whether a direct relationship exists between ISDS 
and FDI for a country. The ultimate position is that it is not conclusive that having 
ISDS increases FDI for a country. Rather, the totality of various host-state conditions 
that affect investors play a bigger role in terms of increasing FDI. Therefore, merely 
abrogating ISDS should not spell doom for RSA.  
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Finally, this chapter has demonstrated that there are various internationally 
recognised solutions to ISDS. Each country is therefore at liberty to implement a 
solution that suits its own developmental needs. In this regard, this Chapter has also 
considered how the solutions implemented by RSA and Australia respectively fit into 
the internationally recognised solutions.  
 
The next chapter is the last chapter of this paper. It concludes the paper, and 
summarises the main findings of this research paper and also makes 
recommendations on viable solutions that countries can implement in response to 
ISDS problems discussed throughout the paper.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter five is the conclusion for this paper. It is in two parts. The first part contains 
a summary of findings of this research. This includes a summary of the solutions to 
ISDS problems as implemented by RSA and Australia respectively, and also as 
internationally recognised. It also includes a summary of findings on the strengths 
and weaknesses of the solutions, and a summary of some of the factors that affect a 
country‘s ISDS policies. The second part of this chapter contains recommendations 
on the solution that countries should implement in response to the problem that ISDS 
encroaches on a host state‘s policy space. The recommendations especially focus 
on developing and least developed countries. The recommendations are largely 
drawn from the arguments made throughout the paper. 
 
5.2. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS   
Many countries are currently preoccupied with reforming their ISDS regimes.342 One 
of the main reasons that triggered this reform is that ISDS limits a host state‘s public 
policy space.343 Two countries that have been embroiled in this reform are RSA and 
Australia. Notably, these two countries have adopted different policies as solutions to 
the ISDS conundrum. This research has examined how these two countries arrived 
at their respective solutions. Further, this research has critically analysed these 
solutions and discussed their strengths and weaknesses.  
 
RSA has enacted the PI Act, under which ISDS shall no longer be an option for 
resolving investment disputes with RSA.344 Instead, the PI Act provides that 
investment disputes can only be resolved through mediation, RSA‘s domestic courts, 
independent tribunals within RSA, statutory bodies within RSA, and state-state 
arbitration upon exhaustion of domestic remedies.345  
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This solution by RSA has received mixed reactions. Investors are generally 
concerned that domestic courts would be partial in favour of the government or in 
favour of the public policy laws or regulations.346 This concern is reasonable because 
notwithstanding that a basic feature of a judicial system in a democratic society is its 
independence from other branches of government,347 the judiciary remains an organ 
of the state and has an inherent duty to serve and protect the interests of its nation 
and its public policies. Another concern by investors, that national legal systems in 
developing countries lack the requisite capacity to handle investment disputes,348 is 
an inaccurate generalisation. Instead, each country‘s national legal system should be 
considered on its own merits. In the case of RSA, it is argued that its domestic courts 
have the requisite capacity to handle investment disputes.349 
 
It has also been observed that abrogating ISDS and redirecting investment disputes 
to domestic courts does not necessarily prevent investors from challenging laws or 
regulations that are implemented as part of public policy. Investors can still pursue 
the claims in domestic courts. However, the case examples discussed in this paper 
show that domestic courts are more inclined to rule in favour of the laws or 
regulations enacted as part of public policy.  
 
Mediation and state-state arbitration are also plausible avenues for resolving 
disputes between investors and host states. Mediation is already being utilised to 
resolve complex public policy issues.350  Similarly, state-state arbitration is not new 
to investment disputes. It is present in many treaties including those where RSA or 
Australia are a party.351 Some weaknesses have been observed regarding the 
manner in which RSA has implemented mediation and state-state arbitration as 
avenues for resolving investment disputes. These weaknesses include lack of time 
limits within which a dispute must have subsisted in the domestic avenues before it 
can be taken for state-state arbitration, and whether more than one domestic remedy 
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has to be attempted before the requirement of exhausting local remedies can be said 
to be satisfied.352  
 
As for Australia, recent trends show that ISDS policies largely depend on the political 
party that is in power. While the Labour Party opts for abrogating ISDS in its entirety, 
the Liberal-led Coalition Party, which is the current ruling party, has opted for 
including ISDS provisions on a treaty-by-treaty approach.353 Certain criteria are 
utilised in implementing this treaty-by-treaty approach. The first criterion entails 
considering the national laws and legal system of the counterparty in order to assess 
whether or not it falls below international best standards and would, thus, not protect 
Australia‘s investments (investors).354 This criterion is problematic for two reasons. 
First, it proceeds on an inaccurate sweeping assumption that national legal systems 
of developing countries fall below international best standards and that the opposite 
holds true for developed countries.355 Secondly, by redirecting investment disputes 
from countries whose national legal systems are found to lack the capacity to handle 
investment disputes, the domestic legal systems of those countries are denied an 
opportunity to improve on their capacity.  
 
The second criterion utilised in the treaty-by-treaty approach is that Australia 
negotiates for inclusion of ISDS provisions in treaties where Australia is a net FDI 
exporter and advocates for exclusion of ISDS in treaties where Australia is a net FDI 
importer.356 This criterion is biased in favour of protecting Australia from ISDS claims 
while exposing its counterparties to a potential ISDS claims. However, unlike RSA, 
Australia‘s approach considers the plight of its outward investors. It is argued that 
discussions of ISDS policies often focus more on protecting public policy regulation 
from ISDS claims by inbound investors, and as a result the discussions overlook the 
importance of ISDS in protecting a country‘s outward investors.357   
 
One of the central arguments in this paper is that the level of outward investments in 
a country has a bigger role to play in determining a country‘s ISDS policy than it is 
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often stated. In this regard, countries that have high levels of outward investments 
stand to benefit more from including ISDS provisions in its treaties. Conversely, 
countries that have low levels (or none) of outward investments would benefit little 
from ISDS because chances are high that their investors would never utilise ISDS. 
Since the level of outward investments for developing countries and least developed 
countries is much lower as compared to most developed countries,358 this paper 
argues that such developing countries and least developed countries are less likely 
to benefit from ISDS provisions as compared with developed countries. Meanwhile, 
developing countries are at higher risk of ISDS claims than developed countries.359 
This leaves developing countries and least developed countries in a position where 
they are not benefiting much from ISDS and at the same time they are more 
negatively affected when compared with developed countries. Consequently, this 
paper argues that a country‘s policy decision on whether or not to include ISDS 
should take into account its level of outward investment, which would normally be 
synonymous to its level of economic development.   
 
Inclusion of ISDS provisions in a treaty is often supported by an argument that 
having ISDS provisions in treaties increases FDI for a country.360 However, research 
has shown that it is not conclusive that having ISDS provisions increases FDI for a 
country.361 Rather, what is more important is the totally of prevailing host-state 
conditions, which include sound domestic policies, regulatory and institutional 
frameworks, quality of institutions, the level of political risk, or the development of the 
financial sector.362 
 
UNCTAD acknowledges problems that ISDS causes, particularly by limiting host 
state‘s regulatory freedom and challenging the public policy changes through 
ISDS.363 As such, it has recommended a range of solutions that countries may 
implement. The recommendations show that there is no single acceptable solution to 
the problem; rather countries are at liberty to implement solutions that fit their 
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respective circumstances and developmental needs. Notably, the alternative 
avenues for resolving investment disputes contained in the PI Act have also been 
recommended by UNCTAD. UNCTAD has further recommended other solutions, not 
implemented by RSA or Australia, but viable and currently being implemented by 
other countries. Some of the solutions are in the nature of establishing new 
institutions. For instance, replacing the system of multiple ad hoc arbitral tribunals 
with a standing international investment court competent to hear all investment 
disputes, with judges elected or appointed by states on a permanent basis and with 
an appeals chamber.364 However, as stated in chapter four, this paper is rather 
interested in the steps that countries should / can take as immediate solutions to the 
ISDS conundrum rather than solutions of an institutional nature. The next section 
contains recommendations on solutions that countries can implement. 
 
5.3. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Unlike developed countries, developing countries and least developed countries 
should abrogate ISDS, and only retain it with limited application as explained below.  
This follows from the finding in this paper that developing countries and least 
developed countries are in a position where they do not benefit much from ISDS and 
yet it negatively affects them more when compared with developed countries. As the 
developing countries or least developed countries abrogate ISDS, they should 
ensure that the totality of the host-state conditions that affect FDI remain attractive to 
investors and they should also assure investors that their investments remain 
protected despite abrogating ISDS for public policy reasons. 
 
ISDS should not, however, be abrogated without providing for viable alternative 
avenues for resolving investment disputes. Host-state‘s domestic courts are arguably 
not a convincing alternative to ISDS as they are likely to be inclined in favour of the 
laws or regulations implemented under the auspices of a country‘s public policies. 
However, domestic courts should always be available to investors for various interim 
and interlocutory applications and remedies during the subsistence of the 
investment. 
 
                                                          
364
 UNCTAD IPFSD (2015) 108. 
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Considering that each avenue for resolving disputes discussed in chapter four has its 
own weaknesses, mediation presents a comparatively more-balanced avenue for 
resolving investment disputes. Using mediation means that investors would no 
longer have the concerns that they normally have regarding domestic courts, and at 
the same time host-states would no longer have the concerns that they have 
regarding ISDS. However, the weaknesses of mediation process ought to be 
addressed in the regulatory framework that would set mediation as the main avenue 
for resolving investment disputes. A time limit within which each step in the 
mediation process ought to take place has to be specifically indicated. The time 
limits would also force the bureaucratic decisions by the host-state to be speeded 
up.  Further, mediation would maintain the cordial relationship between the investors 
and host-states, especially considering the importance of investments to economies 
of some developing and least develop countries. However, mediation may suffer 
from its non-binding nature. Hence, the regulatory framework should indicate what 
should happen if the dispute is not resolved through the mediation process, or if 
either party fails to adhere to the set time limits.  
 
If the dispute fails to be resolved through mediation, both ISDS and state-state 
arbitration should be available options, with the following conditions. If the dispute 
involves a challenge of public policy laws or regulations, it should be resolved 
through state-state arbitration. Conversely, if the nature of a dispute is such that it 
does not involve a challenge of a public policy law or regulation, thus purely 
investment issues, the dispute should be resolved through ISDS. This would balance 
the concerns by investors that state-state arbitration would politicise investment 
disputes and on the other hand avoid submitting to ISDS disputes that have a 
bearing on a host state‘s public policy. 
 
A problem with this option would be that parties may not always agree on whether or 
not a dispute involves a challenge of public policy regulations. In order to resolve this 
problem, the regulatory framework could include a clause that if there is 
disagreement on whether or not the dispute involves a challenge of public policy 
regulations, the mediator for each dispute should have the power to provide a 
binding determination on this aspect alone.  
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The dispute settlement clause embodying this solution can be inserted either in BITs 
or in domestic legislation as is the case with RSA. This solution can be implemented 
by countries whilst awaiting implementation of institutional solutions like the 
international investment court discussed in chapter four.   
 
As discussed in chapter four, developed countries seemingly benefit more from 
ISDS. As such, a problem may arise where the BIT is between a developing (or least 
developed) country and a developed country because the two states would advocate 
for exclusion and inclusion of ISDS provisions respectively. In such circumstances, it 
is recommended that ISDS provisions are excluded because only the developed 
country is likely to benefit from it. If the BIT involves both developed countries, the 
two states may agree on whether or not to include ISDS as they are at relatively 
similar risks of ISDS problems, due to possible similar levels of inward / outward 
investments.  
 
All in all, other countries should learn some valuable lessons from the solutions to 
ISDS problems that have been implemented by RSA and Australia respectively. For 
developing countries and least developed countries, it is advisable to avoid recourse 
to ISDS unless with limited application. Mediation could be utilised as the main 
method for resolving investment disputes, with state-state arbitration and ISDS only 
available upon failure of mediation as explained above.  
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